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HOW CLEAR IS “CLEAR” ENOUGH?
Ryan D. Doerfler*

“How much ambiguity is enough?” was the deceptively simple question
repeatedly put forward by Justice Neil Gorsuch in oral argument for American
Hospital Association v. Becerra. Silly as the question was meant to seem, much
turns on the response. Most obvious are the effects on the practice of
administrative agencies and the implications for years of precedent
surrounding the Chevron doctrine. But far beyond administrative law, the
response also has substantial ramifications for the law of interpretation since it
is centered in the complementary notion of clarity. Notwithstanding the stakes,
the government’s lawyer struggled to give a concise response. Rather than trying
to answer Justice Gorsuch’s question without further clarification it would have
been more effective to ask what kind of response he was looking for or, more
provocatively, by asking Justice Gorsuch how certain he takes himself to be
when he declares a statute clear. As we will see, when it comes to drawing a line
between ambiguous and clear, the answer is far from straightforward.
This Article proposes an entirely new framework for evaluating doctrines that
assign legal significance to whether a statutory text is “clear.” Previous
scholarship has failed to recognize that such doctrines come in two distinct
types. The first, which this Article calls rules of evidence, instruct a court to
“start with the text,” and to proceed to other sources of statutory meaning only
if absolutely necessary. Because they structure a court’s search for what a
statute means, the question with each of these doctrines is whether adhering to
it aids or impairs that search—the character of the evaluation is, in other words,
mostly epistemic. The second type, which this Article calls rules of decision,
instead tell a court to decide a statutory case on some ground other than
statutory meaning if, after considering all the available sources, what the
statute means remains opaque. The idea underlying these doctrines is that if
statutory meaning is uncertain, erring in some direction constitutes “playing it
safe.” With each such doctrine, the question is thus whether erring in the
identified direction really is “safer” than the alternative(s)—put differently,
evaluation of these doctrines is fundamentally practical.
Perhaps the most important implication of drawing the distinction between
rules of evidence and rules of decision is that doing so necessitates a rethinking
of the relationship between the Skidmore and Chevron doctrines. Because rules
of evidence help manage uncertainty that remains after the search for statutory
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Charles
Barzun, William Baude, Maggie Blackhawk, Mitchell Berman, Richard Fallon, Jonah
Gelbach, Roderick Hills, Aziz Huq, Howell Jackson, John Manning, Jennifer Nou,
Jeffrey Pojanowski, David Pozen, Frederick Schauer, Asher Steinberg, and Matthew
Stephenson for helpful comments and suggestions.
*
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meaning, it will almost always make sense for courts to apply any relevant rule
of evidence (e.g. Skidmore) before determining whether a statute is or is not
“clear” for purposes of some rule of decision (e.g. Chevron). In other words,
Skidmore cannot coherently be thought of as a fall-back option, should Chevron
cease to be treated as law. The two doctrines are complements, not alternatives.
With the new framework in place, this Article then goes on to address the
increasingly popular categorical objection to “clear” text doctrines at which
Justice Gorsuch gestured in American Hospital Association. As this Article
explains, the objection that nobody knows how clear a text has to be to count as
“clear” rests partly on a misunderstanding of how “clarity” determinations
work—such determinations are sensitive to context, including legal context, in
ways critics of these doctrines fail to account for. In addition, the objection that
“clear” text doctrines are vulnerable to willfulness or motivated reasoning is fair
but, as this Article shows, applies with equal force to any plausible alternative.

3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326550

INTRODUCTION
Everyone agrees that courts must adhere to “clear” or “plain”
But what to do when a statute is “ambiguous” or its meaning is
otherwise uncertain?2
Numerous legal doctrines condition the
permissibility of some judicial action in a statutory case upon the statute
at issue being less than “clear” or “plain.” Courts may, for example,
defer to an administering agency (Chevron deference),3 avoid answering
a constitutional question4 (constitutional avoidance), or consider
legislative history if a statutory text has more than one plausible
meaning, but not otherwise.5 Taken together, these various doctrines
make textual “clarity” (or, alternatively, “plainness”) the central
organizing principle for much of our law of statutory interpretation.6
And, indeed, the same has been true (albeit to varying degrees7) going
back to Chief Justice Marshall, who remarked that where “words in the
body of the statute” are “plain,” there is “nothing … left to construction,”
text.1

As a matter of positive law, that is. E.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (“[P]olicy arguments cannot supersede the clear
statutory text.”); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any
case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.
And where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat)
76, 95–96 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The intention of the legislature is to be collected
from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no
room for construction.”).
2 Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 128, 128 (Lawrence Solan & Peter Tiersma eds.
2012) (observing that “[i]n a colloquial sense, both vagueness and ambiguity are
employed generically to indicate indeterminacy,” but that “[i]n a more technical sense
… ambiguity and vagueness are far more specific phenomena”).
3 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
4 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (When the validity of an act of the Congress
is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
5 N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510
U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear.”).
6 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1082 (2017) (“Interpretation isn’t just a matter of language; it’s also governed by
law.”).
7 See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543–544
(1940) (“When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is
available, there certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the
words may appear on superficial examination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
1
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but that where “ambiguit[y]” remains, “the mind … seizes every thing
from which aid can be derived.”8
Because it is a doctrinal “linchpin,”9 a great deal often turns on
whether a statutory text is “clear” (or “plain”) or not.10 Perhaps for that
reason, however, scholars and jurists have started to question whether
it makes sense, either in principle or as a matter of practice, to assign
so much importance to clarity determinations. There are those who
have asked why courts should “seize” that “from which aid can be
derived” only if the text is “ambiguous.”11 Or, as Justice Stevens put it,
“[W]hy … confine ourselves to … the statutory text if other tools of
statutory construction provide better evidence”?12 Others, like Justices
Kavanaugh and Gorsuch, are even more skeptical and query whether
we even know what it means to say that a statutory text is “clear.” 13
Going further still, Judge Easterbrook asserts with characteristic
bluntness: “There is no metric for clarity.”14
This Article attempts to clarify15 the increasingly dogmatic
discussion surrounding the range of “clear” text doctrines.16 As it
explains, in working through the question of ‘how clear is enough,’ we
need to ascertain first what type of clarity we are talking about. As such,
it is important to note that clarity doctrines can actually be sorted into
two distinct types, with largely distinct concerns associated with each.
The first type, which operate as rules of evidence, raise largely
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805).
Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F Guzior, & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An
Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257 (2010)
(“Determinations of ambiguity are the linchpin of statutory interpretation.”).
10 Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 859, 861 (2004) (“Part of the problem is that the law has only two ways to
characterize the clarity of a legal text: It is either plain or it is ambiguous. The
determination is important.”).
11 See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 539 (2017); Adam M. Samaha, If the Text is Clear: Lexical Ordering in Statutory
Interpretation 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115 (2018).
12 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
13 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
14 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62 (1988) (emphasis added).
15 (Ha ha.)
16 This Article addressing doctrines that assign significance to the “clarity” of statutory
text, as opposed to clarity of the law more generally. See Richard M. Re, Clarity
Doctrines, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1497 (2019) (addressing the latter). On the relevance of
that distinction, see infra notes 159-164.
8
9
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epistemological concerns to the extent that they structure a court’s
inquiry into what a statute means.17 Because they organize a court’s
search for statutory meaning, the concerns associated with this type of
doctrine are largely epistemological–they function, in other words, to
help judges form true beliefs about what statutes mean. More
specifically, these doctrines tell courts to “start with the text,”18 and to
consider additional sources of statutory meaning only if absolutely
necessary.19 For reasons this Article explains, this sort of lexical
ordering of evidence hinders an investigation except in unusual
circumstances,20 which is why rules of evidence need to be carefully
contained to such circumstances.
The second type of “clear” text doctrines operate, by contrast, as
rules of decision, instructing a court how to decide a statutory case when,
despite its best efforts, it isn’t sure what the statute at issue means. 21
In other words, the function of the second type of doctrine is not to help
determine the meaning of a statute, but rather to provide guidance for
how to decide a statutory case once it becomes apparent that the
meaning of the statute at issue is not. The basic premise underlying
rules of decision is that, under conditions of uncertainty, sometimes
erring in a particular direction constitutes “playing it safe.”22 The
concerns associated with these doctrines are, in light of that premise,
mostly practical. In each instance, the question is whether a court’s
erring in the identified direction is actually “safer” than acting on its
See infra Part I.A.
Adam M. Samaha, Starting with the Text—On Sequencing Effects in Statutory
Interpretation and Beyond, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 439, 440 (2016).
19 Here and throughout, this Article uses the phrase “statutory meaning” to refer to
the communicative content expressed by statutory text as used—roughly, Congress’s
apparent communicative intention (or, alternatively, the conventional meaning of the
language as used in the relevant context). See Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of
Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 783, 796-99 (2017) (distinguishing communicative
intention from other forms of intention); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning
of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1235, 1246-48 (2015) (calling this a statute’s “contextual” meaning). This
Article takes no position on how best to conceive of Congress’s communicative intention
(e.g., actual or “objectified”) or how best to identify it (e.g., whether to consider
legislative history).
20 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
21 See infra Part I.B.
22 Here and throughout this Article uses the term “uncertainty” in a colloquial sense,
encompassing both “risk” and “uncertainty” in the technical, decision-theoretic senses
of those terms. See DANIEL M HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 30-31 (1996) (contrasting situations of “risk,” in
which the probabilities of the various possible outcomes are known, and situations of
“uncertainty,” in which those probabilities are unknown).
17
18
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“best guess” or, alternatively, erring in some other direction. Is it, for
example, safer to err in the direction of letting elected officials, via
administrative agencies, decide how to resolve a case or would this
rather be a costly mistake, leading us, to echo Justice John Roberts,
down the road to administrative “tyranny.”23
Using the basic distinction between rules of evidence and rules of
decision, this Article develops a framework for assessing individual
“clear” text doctrines that is both completely new and also easy to
administer. Within that framework, one asks first whether a given
doctrine manages evidence in a determination of the meaning of a
statute or, instead, manages uncertainty about how to proceed once the
quest for meaning has come up short. If the doctrine manages evidence,
one then goes on to determine whether the type of evidence it manages
has some or all of the special characteristics that make lexical ordering
of evidence epistemically sensible. If, alternatively, the doctrine
manages uncertainty, one instead evaluates the risk analysis that
underlies it: is one type of mistake really costlier than the other, as the
doctrine presupposes, and, if so, to what degree?
In addition, the distinction between rules of evidence and rules of
decision provides a principled basis for answering longstanding
questions concerning the relationship between different “clear” text
doctrines, in particular the order in which such doctrines should be
applied.24 As this Article explains, because rules of decision help
manage uncertainty that remains after the search for statutory
meaning, it will almost always make sense for courts to apply any
relevant rule of evidence (e.g., the conditional admissibility of legislative
history or Skidmore) before determining whether a statute is or is not
“clear” for purposes of some rule of decision (e.g., the rule of lenity or
Chevron).25 So understood, perhaps the most important implication for
administrative law of drawing the distinction between rules of evidence
and rules of decision is that doing so necessitates a rethinking of the
relationship between the Skidmore and Chevron doctrines as
City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation:
Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2063 (2017)
(“It remains unanswered whether a policy canon is still relevant if legislative history
alone would clarify statutory language.”); James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the
Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2010)
(worrying that the “lack of an intelligible framework for ordering the canons renders
them distinctly more susceptible to judicial manipulation than other interpretive
resources”).
25 See infra Parts III.C & D.
23
24
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complements rather than alternatives. In other words, Skidmore cannot
coherently be thought of as a fall-back option should Chevron cease to
be treated as law, as is almost universally assumed.
Notice though that the distinction between rules of evidence and
rules of decision does not by itself address the question of how clear is
clear enough, or, as Justice Gorsuch put it in oral argument in American
Hospital Association, ‘How much ambiguity is enough?’ Which brings us
to increasingly popular categorical objections to “clear” text doctrines.26
According to numerous jurists and scholars, all “clear” text doctrines are
worrisome insofar as there is no consensus among judges as to how clear
a statutory text has to be to count as “clear.”27 How confident does one
need to be? Confronted with two options, meaning A or meaning B, is
65-35 enough, or does “clarity” require 90-10?28 Beyond that, many fear
that because it is easy for judges to exaggerate or understate—whether
consciously or unconsciously—how clear a text is, such doctrines
facilitate results-oriented decision making and thus undermine public
confidence in an impartial judiciary.29 If “clarity” judgments are mere
See infra Part II.
See Meredith A. Holland, The Ambiguous Ambiguity Inquiry: Seeking to Clarify
Judicial Determinations of Clarity Versus Ambiguity in Statutory Interpretation, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2018) (“[T]here is no established method governing
the judge’s threshold determination of ambiguity versus clarity. In fact, there is no
consistent definition of ambiguity.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in
Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 90 (2017) (“[T]he Justices do not agree
on what ‘ambiguity’ means for purposes of the rule [of lenity].”); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (2016) (noting “lurking questions about
how hard courts ought to work before deciding whether a statute is clear”); Kavanaugh,
supra note 13, at 1238 (“The simple and troubling truth is that no definitive guide
exists for determining whether statutory language is clear or ambiguous.”); Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 520 (“Here, of course, is the chink in Chevron’s armor—the ambiguity that
prevents it from being an absolutely clear guide to future judicial decisions (though
still a better one than what it supplanted). How clear is clear?”).
28 Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 1237.
29 Id. at 1237-38; Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1304 (2002) (“On other
occasions, however, the Justices may reveal substantive policy preferences not in
formulating rules, but in applying them.”); Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 62 (“[C]ourts
may choose when to declare the language of the statute ‘ambiguous.’”); see also Solan,
supra note 10, at 859 (“The problem, perhaps ironically, is that the concept of
ambiguity is itself perniciously ambiguous. People do not always use the term in the
same way, and the differences often appear to go unnoticed.”); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) (suggesting that variation in the degree
of clarity required reflect “the Court's view of what is an important constitutional
value,” as well as “the relative importance of different constitutional values”).
26
27
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reflections of partisan attitudes, these critics suggest, adherence to
“clear” text doctrines undermines the rule of law.
As this Article explains, the lack of a universal “clarity” standard
should be both unsurprising and unconcerning.30 To say that a statutory
text is “clear” is, in effect, to say that it is clear enough for present
purposes. And since purposes vary from case to case—and, in particular,
from doctrine to doctrine—so too, one should expect, does the degree of
clarity required.31 Relatedly, if judges disagree about how clear a text
must be in some specific case, that is, at least very often, just a legal
dispute about the purposes of the applicable doctrine.
On results-oriented decision making, this Article argues that
what critics have identified is, for the most part, the familiar and
entirely general worry that, in close cases, judges can mischaracterize
the law without serious reputational harm.32 While true that a judge
can with a straight face (and, perhaps, a clean conscience) insist that a
very likely reading of a statute is “clearly” correct (or vice versa), it is
equally easy for a judge to declare “more likely than not” a reading that
is somewhat unlikely. As such, by increasing the probability threshold
a reading must satisfy for a court to enforce it from the typical “more
likely than not” to the more demanding “clear,” “clear” text doctrines do
nothing to increase opportunity for judicial willfulness or motivated
reasoning. What they do instead is merely shift the site of plausible
argumentation.
So, how much ambiguity is enough? It should, at this point, be
apparent that Justice Gorsuch’s question needn’t operate as a rhetorical
gotcha but rather as an invitation to determine what type of clarity
doctrine we are dealing with (a rule of evidence or a rule of decision),
and, correspondingly, what legal purpose the doctrine at issue serves.
This Article has three Parts. Part I distinguishes between two
types of “clear” text doctrines, rules of evidence and rules of decision,
identifying concerns specific to each. Part II considers common
objections to “clear” text doctrines generally, explaining why those
objections are either misguided or generic. Part III shows this Article’s

See infra Part II.A.
As with “intention,” this Article takes no position on how best to conceive of or
identify a legal doctrine’s underlying “purpose(s).” See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1944-47
(2018) (discussing Chevron in light of administrative law’s “internal morality”).
32 See infra Part II.B.
30
31

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326550

proposed framework in action, assessing various familiar “clear” text
doctrines, with some passing the assessment and some not.

I. “CLEAR” TEXT DOCTRINES
It is a platitude that courts may not deviate from “clear” statutory
text. What exactly this platitude entails is a matter of some confusion.
As this Part explains, a host of doctrines within statutory interpretation
are fashioned as complements to the consensus position that “when the
intent of Congress is clear from the statutory text, that is the end of the
matter.”33 Each of these doctrines permits a court to attend to
something other than statutory text, but only if the text in question
leaves the intent of Congress unknown.34
Despite their apparent similarity, these various “clear” text
doctrines come in two importantly different varieties—varieties that
reflect a basic ambiguity in courts’ insistence upon the importance of
“clear” statutory text.
As this Part explains, the first variety of “clear” text doctrine let
courts consider various sources of statutory meaning only if considering
the statutory text in isolation leaves a statute’s meaning uncertain.
Such rules of evidence are peculiar, epistemically speaking. Ordinarily,
sources of evidence are either helpful to consider or not. Harder to see
is why the helpfulness of considering one source (e.g., legislative history)
might turn upon the probative value of some other (e.g., statutory text).
As this Part goes on to show, there are unusual circumstances in which
this sort of conditional admissibility of evidence does make sense—for
instance, if evidence is probative but, for reasons of psychological bias,
one is disposed to overweight it. Less clear, though, is whether familiar
rules of evidence like the plain meaning rule are appropriately limited
to those unusual circumstances.
As this Part continues, the second variety of “clear” text doctrine
instruct courts to decide statutory cases on grounds other than statutory
meaning if, after considering all available sources, what a statute means
remains unclear. These rules of decision are, in contrast to rules of
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 105 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
34 Again, however congressional “intent” is best conceived. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
33
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evidence, epistemically straightforward.
A familiar approach to
reasoning under conditions of uncertainty is to err in some direction on
the rationale of “playing it safe.” An assumption underlying this
approach, of course, is that one type of mistake is much worse to make
than the other, either individually or in the aggregate. When it comes
to familiar rules of decision like the canon of constitutional avoidance,
the question is thus whether the cost assignments underlying those
doctrines are accurate. Is it really much worse, for example, to misread
a statute and declare it unconstitutional than it is to misread and then
enforce it?

A. Rules of Evidence
Sometimes when a court says that statutory text is “clear,” what
it means is that the meaning of a statute can be discerned by attending
to its text exclusively. In Milner v. Navy,35 for example, the question
was whether a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption for
material “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency” included data and maps pertaining to the storage of
explosives at a naval base.36 The Court held that no. As Justice Kagan
explained, the exemption’s limitation to “personnel” matters plainly
excluded maps and data unrelated to “employee relations [or] human
resources.”37 Responding to the suggestion that a House Report
concerning FOIA supported the opposite conclusion, she remarked that
while legislative history may help “illuminate ambiguous text,” it may
not be appealed to for the purpose of “muddy[ing] clear statutory
language.”38 In calling the language of the exemption “clear,” Justice
Kagan was thus indicating that there was no need to consider
extratextual evidence—in this case, legislative history—to figure out
what that exemption means.
One way to understand the platitude that courts must adhere to
“clear” statutory text is, then, as an instruction to courts to prioritize
textual evidence of statutory meaning over other, extratextual evidence.
So understood, this platitude expresses what is sometimes referred to
562 U.S. 562 (2011).
Id. at 564-65 (2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)).
37 Id. at 569, 581.
38 Id. at 572; see also id. at 574 (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account,
is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”).
35
36
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as the “plain meaning” rule.39 The plain meaning rule is, in reality, a
cluster of specific rules, each of which relates to some extratextual
source of statutory meaning—legislative history,40 institutional
practice,41 statutory titles,42 etc. Each specific rule permits a court to
consider the source at issue, but only if the available textual evidence
leaves statutory meaning uncertain. In this way, the plain meaning rule
imposes lexical ordering on a court’s investigation into statutory
meaning: Start with the statutory text and proceed to other sources only
if absolutely necessary.43
This “start with the text” approach to statutory interpretation
might seem like a sensible intermediate position between strict
textualism and some form of all-things-considered eclecticism or
pragmatism.
Upon reflection, though, the lexical ordering of
interpretive sources gives rise to a puzzle.44 Ordinarily, information is
either helpful to an investigation or not. For that reason, policies of
categorical inclusion or exclusion of specific types of information are
easy to understand and, unsurprisingly, familiar features of our legal
landscape. To illustrate, in the eyes of Congress, cost is a relevant
consideration when assessing whether to regulate emissions from
stationary sources like power plants or factories. The Environmental
Protection Agency is thus required to at least consider cost when
deciding whether to regulate such sources, even when the noneconomic
concerns are overwhelming.45 By contrast, cost is, in Congress’s view,
irrelevant when evaluating threshold nuclear safety measures. Hence,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may not consider cost when

Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, at 541 (“The plain meaning rule says that
otherwise-relevant information about statutory meaning is forbidden when the
statutory text is plain or unambiguous.”).
40 United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 46 n.5 (2013) (“Whether or not legislative
history is ever relevant, it need not be consulted when, as here, the statutory text is
unambiguous.”).
41 Milner, 562 U.S. at 575-76 (reasoning that “clear statutory language” makes
irrelevant “30 years” of contrary practice by lower courts); United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 245–46 (1989) (reasoning that “pre-Code practice” is
relevant only if statutory text is less than “clear”).
42 Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–529 (1947) (recognizing
“the wise rule that the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the
plain meaning of the text”).
43 See Samaha, supra note 11, at 162 (explaining lexical ordering); see also Adam M.
Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661 (2010) (exploring the use of
lexically inferior decision rules as legal “tiebreakers”).
44 This puzzle is articulated more fully in Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, at 546-49.
45 See Michigan v EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-08 (2015).
39
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determining what is “adequate protection to the health and safety of the
public.”46
More difficult to understand are policies of conditional inclusion
or exclusion of certain information. For example, if legislative history is
evidence of statutory meaning, why not consider it in all statutory cases?
Even if textual evidence points strongly in one direction, what is the
harm in at least looking at that extratextual source? Alternatively, if
legislative history is irrelevant or misleading for purposes of
interpretation, why consider it ever? Even if textual evidence is largely
unhelpful in some case, considering an irrelevant or misleading source
can only make things worse.
As it turns out, there are at least a couple of potential answers to
the rhetorical questions above.47 If certain information is especially
costly to consider, for example, it would make sense, assuming limited
resources, to start by considering cheaper information.48 If one can rule
out a restaurant based on the menu, there is no reason to try it in
person.49 Somewhat differently, if information is probative but, for
reasons of psychological bias, one is disposed to overweight it, one might
be justified in turning to that information only if non-biasing
information leaves one uncertain.50 Job talks by aspiring academics, for
instance, may do more harm than good if the paper record is clear. Such
talks may at the same time prove helpful if, after considering written
materials, the faculty finds itself on the fence.
These sorts of special considerations may or may not support the
assorted rules of evidence that make up the plain meaning rule.
Legislative history is conceivably too expensive to consider as a matter
of course. But statutory titles? Hardly so. Beyond that, lexically
ordering sources of statutory meaning introduces opportunity for
willfulness or motivate reasoning that may swamp any would-be
efficiency gains. This objection is considered more fully below.51 Very
briefly, though, it is not hard to see how a willful or motivated judge
might exaggerate how clear textual evidence makes things, thereby
42 U.S.C. § 2232(a); Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 824 F.2d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that “[t]he Commission must
determine, regardless of costs, the precautionary measures necessary to provide
adequate protection to the public”).
47 See Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, at 549-65 (surveying possible answers).
48 Id. at 549-51.
49 A vegan, for example, deciding against a steakhouse.
50 Id. at 552-54.
51 See infra Part II.B.
46
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excluding from consideration other, less convenient evidence.
Importantly, the costs of exaggeration and understatement of textual
clarity are asymmetrical with such “plain meaning” doctrines insofar as
understatement results only in marginal underweighting of textual
evidence, whereas overstatement results in the total exclusion of nontextual evidence.

B. Rules of Decision
Other times, in calling statutory language “clear,” what a court
means is that statutory meaning is apparent based upon whichever
source(s). Within the Chevron framework, courts defer to the policy
judgment of an administering agency unless “Congress has spoken
clearly” on the issue.52 To see whether Congress has made itself
sufficiently clear, courts employ the “traditional tools of statutory
construction,” which include most obviously attention to statutory text,
but also consideration of, for example, linguistic canons,53 practical
consequences,54 and, for those who consider it at all, legislative history.55
Hence, as Justice Scalia explained, “[a] statutory provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified” as additional information
gets folded in.56
The other way to hear the platitude that courts must adhere to
“clear” text is, accordingly, as forbidding courts from substituting, say,
more desirable policy for identifiable statutory meaning. Interpreted
this way, the platitude is a complement to numerous legal doctrines that
purport not to aid in the search for statutory meaning, but instead to
help courts decide cases when statutory meaning remains opaque.
City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 308 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
53 See National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522
U.S. 479, 500, 502 (1998).
54 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (rejecting an
agency reading based partly on the “calamitous consequences of interpreting the Act
in that way”).
55 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation
of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we
should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961))).
56 Util. Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2442.
52
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Again, Chevron is the most straightforward example. Within that
framework, courts defer to an administering agency only if a statute is
“silent” or “ambiguous” on the question at issue.57 Even more explicitly,
courts say that filling such a statutory “gap” requires a “policy choice”
on the part of the administering agency.58 Taken together, such
remarks suggest that Chevron deference has nothing to do with
identifying statutory meaning.59 Rather, it is only if statutory meaning
cannot be identified—again, after employing all the traditional tools—
that deferring to an administering agency is called for.
Unlike the rules of evidence discussed above, doctrines like
Chevron are, in terms of structure, epistemically straightforward.
Because an administering agency is not an authority on what a statute
means, it makes sense for a court not to defer to that agency when
investigating statutory meaning.60 But sometimes investigations into
statutory meaning come up empty, or at least leave courts less than
certain. What to do then? One approach is for a court to give its “best
guess,” enforcing the reading of the statute it thinks is most likely
correct. That is what courts do in run-of-the-mill statutory cases—and,
really, all that they can do when there is no other legal basis for deciding
the case.61
Another approach, though, is for a court to err in a certain
direction, enforcing a reading that is, for some reason, safer even if it is
less likely correct than some other. The idea of “playing it safe” is
familiar from everyday life.62 Suppose, for example, that leaving for the
airport at 8:30 AM would only “probably” allow one to make one’s flight.
Barring unusual circumstances, one would opt in that situation to leave
a bit earlier, reasoning that it is better to wait around at the gate than
to be left there. The same reasoning might easily apply in a statutory
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
Id. at 866.
59 In this respect, the Chevron framework differs interestingly from the earlier
approach to agency deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift. See infra Part III.C.
60 At least, not a legal authority. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 27 (1983) (“To be sure, the court must interpret the statute; it must decide what has
been committed to the agency.”). An administering agency may, nonetheless, be an
epistemic authority on the issue. See infra notes 293-305 and accompanying text.
61 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
984, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2701 (2005) (contrasting cases in which a court decides a case
based upon the “best reading” of a statute with those in which a court a court
determines there is only one “permissible reading”).
62 See Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 549-51
(2018).
57
58
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case. If reading A is only “probably” correct, and erroneously enforcing
reading B (also plausible, let’s assume) would be much less costly than
erroneously enforcing reading A, enforcing reading B might constitute
the safer course of action even though reading A is more likely correct.
As with any other type of decision, the reason(s) might vary
significantly why erroneously enforcing one reading of a statute would
be less costly than erroneously enforcing some other.
Most
straightforwardly, misinterpreting a statute one way might yield
immediate consequences that are much worse than those that would
result from the opposite type of mistake.63 Alternatively, one type of
mistake might be less costly to correct. 64 Moving beyond individual
decisions, erring in a particular direction might be less costly on average
or in the aggregate, in which case courts would reduce costs by erring
that way in the relevant class of cases.65
Numerous legal doctrines instruct courts to err in some direction
when deciding a certain type of statutory case absent “clear” statutory
meaning. The premise of these doctrines seems to be that erring in the
specified direction amounts to “playing it safe” in those cases. Again,
within the Chevron framework, courts defer to an administering
agency’s policy judgment unless the statute at issue is “clear.” This
means that in some situations, a court will defer to an agency even
though it thinks that some other reading is more likely to be correct as
a matter of interpretation.66 Implicit in that rule of decision, then, is
that it is safer to err in the direction of an agency’s policy judgment if
statutory meaning is uncertain. Better to leave in place an agency policy

In addition, the types of consequences at issue might vary, ranging from concrete
harms to individuals (e.g., erroneously imposed fines or imprisonment) to abstract
harms to institutions (e.g., a loss of legitimacy).
64 Here, an everyday analogy would be something like deciding whether to send an
email/text late at night. Come morning, one type of mistake is ordinarily much easier
to correct than the other.
65 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 5 (2006) (arguing that “judges should interpret
legal texts in accordance with rules whose observance produces the best consequences
overall” (emphasis added)).
66 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980 (holding that courts must enforce an agency’s reading
“even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation”).
63
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(or agency policies67) Congress has precluded, in other words, then to
displace one that it has not.68
One may or may not agree with Chevron’s underlying substantive
assessment.69 With any rule of decision, there is always the question
whether the doctrine manages uncertainty wisely. To use another
example, the canon of constitutional avoidance seems to presuppose that
misreading and then enforcing a statute is much better than misreading
and then declining to enforce it.70 If one rejects that presupposition—
and some do—one probably thinks that the canon of constitutional
avoidance ought to go.71 Whatever one thinks of any of these doctrines
in terms of substance, however, the point here is just that rules of
decision are, in contrast to rules of evidence, unpuzzling in terms of
form. With each such doctrine, the idea is, again, that erring in some
direction constitutes “playing it safe.” That approach to reasoning under
conditions of uncertainty is both familiar and straightforward.

*

*

*

As Justice Kagan remarked, federal judges in the United States
are “all textualists now.”72 But what does that mean, exactly? It is part
of our law of statutory interpretation that judges may not deviate from
“clear” statutory text. As this Part has explained, however, this
exaltation of “clear” text is (ironically) ambiguous. Perhaps noncoincidentally, this ambiguity corresponds to a theoretical disagreement

Again, the benefits of adhering to a rule of decision may accrue in the aggregate, as
opposed to in each individual case. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
68 By characterizing it as a rule of decision for situations in which statutory meaning
is not “known,” the account here renders Chevron more obviously compatible with
formalist modes of interpretation. See Jeffrey Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative
Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 896 (2019) (“There will be questions in which arguments
from statutory text, structure, cannons, purpose, history, and the like point to more
than one reasonable answer, but the [formalist] would maintain that choosing which
one is stronger is more a question of lawyerly judgment than first-order policy
preferences.”). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 351, 372-73 (1994) (noting a possible tension between
textualism and Chevron, owed in part to the “creative” intellectual style encouraged
by that methodology).
69 See infra Part III.B.
70 See infra Part III.A.
71 Or at least be adjusted. See id.
72 Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the
Reading of Statutes at 8:09 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalialecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation.
67
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about what makes a method of statutory interpretation “textualist” in
the first place.
Understood one way, textualism is mainly a view about the
legitimate sources of statutory meaning.73 Textualist judges are, on this
picture, ones who attend in statutory cases to “semantic” sources like
statutory language, dictionaries, and linguistic canons, and who ignore
or deemphasize “policy” sources like, most famously, legislative
history.74 Corresponding to this picture of textualism, the various rules
of evidence discussed in Part I.A instruct courts to prioritize “semantic”
sources over “policy” sources through lexical ordering, barring
consideration of “policy” sources if consideration of “semantic” sources
yields a clear answer.
Understood another way, however, textualism has less to do with
legitimate sources of statutory meaning and more to do with legitimate
sources of law.75 On this picture, textualist judges treat what statutory
language communicates (or maybe better, seems to communicate76) as a
statute’s presumptive contribution to the law.77 In turn, such judges
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287,
1288 (2010) (“Textualism maintains that judges should seek statutory meaning in the
semantic import of the enacted text and, in so doing, should reject the longstanding
practice of using unenacted legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative
intent or purpose.”).
74 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 94–95 (2006) (“In short, textualists give precedence to contextual evidence
concerning likely semantic usage while purposivists do the same with contextual cues
that reflect policy considerations.”).
75 See Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV.. 811, 828 (2016) (“As
textualists have long argued, the best (and perhaps only) way for Congress to identify
specific [legislative] means is for it to use specific words.”); John F. Manning, The New
Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 116 (2011) (“If interpreters treat the statutory
text as simply a proxy for the law’s ulterior purpose, they deny legislators the capacity,
through their choice of words, to distinguish those statutes meant to embody specific
policy choices from those meant to leave policy discretion to the law’s implementers.”);
see also Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2435-36 (2017)
(“Law is a source-based enterprise, and understanding its nature accordingly requires
understanding which sources constitute the law and which do not.”).
76 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
77 See Hrafn Asgeirsson, Can Legal Practice Adjudicate Between Theories of
Vagueness?, in VAGUENESS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 95,
103-04 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (arguing that the communicative content
of a statute is coextensive with its legal content absent some “rebutting” or
“undercutting” source of law); Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its
Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39 (Leslie Green & Brian
Leiter eds., 2011) (calling the position according to which a statute’s legal content is
identical to its communicative content the “standard picture,” articulating forceful
objections against that position).
73
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refuse to deviate from what Congress “said” to advance some apparent,
more general policy aim.78 Corresponding to this picture, the different
rules of decision considered in Part I.B require courts to prioritize
statutory meaning over other potential sources of law. These doctrines
permit courts turn to supplementary, non-linguistic sources of law, but
only if the primary source of law, statutory meaning, is uncertain.
These two ways of thinking about textualism are compatible but
logically distinct. One could, for example, accept that what a statute
says is the law, but also that “policy” sources are just as important as
“semantic” ones when figuring out what it is that a statute says.79
Analogously, while one might incline towards both rules of decision like
Chevron and rules of evidence like the conditional admissibility of
legislative history, one could easily, depending in part upon one’s
theoretical inclinations, go in for only one.
A follow-on question80 is whether it even makes sense to look at
statutory meaning through an epistemic lens if one believes, pursuant
to the second way of thinking about textualism, that statutory text “is
not evidence of the law,” but instead “is the law.”81 The discussion of
uncertainty management in Part I.B., for example, seems to presuppose
that a judge could be unsure what a statute means at the end of her
search for statutory meaning. But how could that be if, as “text-is-thelaw” textualists insist, a statutory text means whatever a reasonably
informed interpreter would think that it means?82 Put differently, if a
statute is less than “clear” on this story, isn’t that just to say that that
statute has no meaning for purposes of the case at issue? Or, put
differently, isn’t it to say that the statute’s meaning is
underdetermined? Setting aside difficult philosophical questions about
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In holding
otherwise, the Court replaces what Congress said with what it thinks Congress ought
to have said ….”); see also Doerfler, supra note 74 at 823-34.
79 See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J.
979, 995-98 (2017).
80 Thanks to Dick Fallon for pressing me on this point.
81 Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 82.
82 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392–
93 (2003) (“[Modern textualists] ask how a reasonable person, conversant with the
relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in context.”); Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (explaining that
textualists appeal to “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus
juris”).
78
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the nature of underdeterminacy,83 one response is to observe that taking
an ordinary epistemological approach to truths that are “whatever we
think they are” is familiar from everyday life. When one reads a work
of crime fiction, for instance, one forms various hypotheses about the
identity of the perpetrator, assigning probabilities to each. Sometimes,
however, the novel ends without the identity of the perpetrator being
revealed. In that situation, questions like “Who was the killer?”
plausibly admit of no determinate answer. And yet, awareness of that
possibility (or, for that matter, its realization84) does nothing to prevent
the reader from thinking about such questions in much the same way as
she would if she were reading about some actual crime.
Building on that analogy, one way to understand “text-is-the-law”
textualism is as providing a solution to the familiar problem of
attributing communicative intentions to Congress despite Congress’s
being a “they,” not an “it.”85 The solution this form of textualism
provides is to have judges act as if legislation had a unitary author,
attributing to that legislation whatever communicative intentions one
would attribute to its author as such.86 On this approach, reading
statutory text is thus akin to reading a work of fiction, with the fiction
being that Congress is an “it,” not a “they.”87 As with any other work of
fiction, the reader naturally forms hypotheses about the work, assigns
to them different probabilities, etc. And, happily, none of this is
impaired by the fact the “story,” so to speak, is sometimes cut short.88

II. CATEGORICAL OBJECTIONS

See S.G. Williams, Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
539, 545-54 (2004) (reviewing TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN THE LAW (2000))
(surveying metaphysical and epistemological accounts of indeterminacy).
84 See, e.g., Martha P. Nochimson, Did Tony Die at the End of The Sopranos?, VOX.COM
(Aug 27, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/8/27/6006139/did-tony-die-at-the-end-ofthe-sopranos/.
85 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992); see also Doerfler, supra note 78, at
998-1020 (criticizing more recent attempts to analogize Congress to a corporation).
86 Doerfler, supra note 78, at 1024.
87 Id. at 1022-31 (articulating a “fictionalist” account of congressional intent).
88 In part, this is plausibly owed to the fact that one can always devote further cognitive
resources to answering a question. Especially when the pertinent evidence is varied
and complex, it will often seem possible that, with additional consideration, a “clear”
answer might reveal itself. Further reflection might, in other words, render coherent
a body of evidence that previously seemed conflicting or confusing.
83
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As Part I explains, different “clear” text doctrines do very
different things. For that reason, it would be surprising if it were
possible to assess them as a lot.
A growing number of jurists and scholars are attempting
nonetheless to do just that, arguing, roughly, that “clear” text doctrines
are generally suspect because they are so hard to administer.89 More
specifically, these critics complain that such doctrines produce
unpredictable outcomes both because there is no consensus as to what
they require, and because there is no way to establish whether that
requirement (whatever it is) has been met.
This Part addresses each of these complaints in turn. First, it
argues that the expectation of a universal “clarity” standard is
misguided. As philosophers have shown, the degree of epistemic
confidence or justification required to call something “clear” varies from
context to context. More specifically, as the practical stakes of a
situation increase or decrease, so too does the requisite confidence or
justification. Building upon this insight, this Part reasons that one
should expect that how clear a statutory text must be to count as “clear”
will vary from case to case, and, in particular, from doctrine to doctrine.
Because different “clear” text doctrines serve different purposes, what it
takes to satisfy them should be expected to differ as well. Relative to
some doctrines, calling a text “clear” is, legally speaking, simply not a
big deal. Relative to others, however, it really is.
Second, this Part urges that it is no easier to establish that a text
is or is not “clear” than it is to show that, for example, one reading of a
text is “better” than another. As various critics rightly observe, in some
cases it does seem that what best explains a court’s declaration that a
statute is “clear” (or not) is the court’s policy preference and not the law.
Be that as it may, the same is surely true in some cases in which a court
says that one reading is “better” than another. As this Part suggests,
then, the worry that “clear” text doctrines are vulnerable to willfulness
or motivated reasoning is just an instance of the more general worry
that, in close cases, judges can and do (consciously or unconsciously)
mischaracterize the law without serious reputational harm. “clear” text
doctrines are, in other words, indeed vulnerable to judicial willfulness
or motivated reasoning. That fails to distinguish them, however, from
any other statutory interpretation doctrine.

89

Kavanaugh, supra note 13; see also, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14 at 62.
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A. No Consensus What Required
The first and most popular concern with “clear” text doctrines in
general is that there is no consensus on how clear a statutory text must
be to count as “clear” for doctrinal purposes.90 “If the statute is 60-40 in
one direction, is that enough to call it clear? How about 80-20? Who
knows?”91
The basic question “How clear is clear?” is a reasonable one.92 If
judges are supposed to base decisions upon whether a text is “clear,”
they need to know what “clarity” requires. More still, it does seem right
to suggest that textual clarity has something to do with epistemic
confidence or justification: At a minimum, a statute cannot be “clear” if
the two candidate readings are equally likely. Before assessing whether
60-40 is “enough,” though, it helps to step back and look at how speakers
use epistemic terms like “clear” more generally.
As philosophers have observed, people’s willingness to use certain
epistemic terms varies according to the practical stakes. More
specifically, as the practical stakes of a situation increase or decrease,
speakers become more willing or less willing to deploy terms like “know”
or “clear,” holding constant the level of epistemic confidence or
justification.93 The easiest illustration of this linguistic phenomenon are
pairs of intuitive, everyday examples involving varying practical
circumstances. For instance:

See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 90; see also Brian G. Slocum, The Importance
of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of
Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 807–08
(2010) (“There is no consensus regarding th[e Chevron] standard ….”); Note, “How
Clear Is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1691 (2005)
(“[Applying Chevron,] clarity or ambiguity is the test, and courts have not been
consistent in the level of clarity that they require.” (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)).
91 Id. at 2137. Justice Scalia also appears to have believed that the threshold for
textual “clarity” was constant across cases. See Scalia, supra note 26, at 520-21
(analogizing Chevron to the plain meaning rule). For a contrasting view, see Note,
supra note 89, at 1688 (arguing that “the question ‘How clear is clear?’ should have a
different answer depending upon the circumstances
92 Scalia, supra note 26, at 520-21.
93 See, e.g., KEITH DEROSE, THE CASE FOR CONTEXTUALISM (2009); Jason Stanley,
KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICAL INTERESTS (2005); Jessica Brown, Contextualism and
Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres, 130 PHIL. STUD. 407 (2006).
90
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LOW STAKES:

Two students are several spots down the
waitlist for a seminar, and attending the first session is
mandatory. As they approach the seminar room, they see
a line of eager students out the door. Taking this seminar
is not especially important to either. Although the meeting
time is fairly convenient, the topic does not interest either
that much. Looking at the line, one student suggests to the
other, “Let’s go for food instead.” The other student
responds, “Are you sure? The class time is really good for
my schedule.” The first student replies, “Just look at the
line. It’s clear that we’re not going to get in anyway.”
HIGH STAKES:

Two waitlisted students are approaching the
seminar room, as in LOW STAKES, and notice the line out the
door. Again, one student again suggests to the other going
out for food, reasoning that neither will make it off the
waitlist. In this case, however, getting into the seminar is
very important to both. The topic is in an area in which
they would both like to work, and the professor is
incredibly important and influential. The other student
reminds the first of these facts, and then says, “Sometimes
people drop. Is it really clear that we won’t get in?”
Remaining as confident as she was before that neither will
make it off the waitlist, still, she replies, “Well, no. We’d
better go in just to be safe.”94
What these examples and others like them suggest is that the
appropriateness of claiming that something is “clear” can be affected by
the practical stakes.95 In LOW STAKES, it seems appropriate for the
speaker to claim that it is “clear” that neither student will make it off
the waitlist based upon apparent enthusiasm. In HIGH STAKES, by
contrast, it seems appropriate for the speaker to refrain from making
such a claim, even though the evidence available to her concerning the
chances of making it off the waitlist is the same. What explains the
difference? Ostensibly, it is just that, in HIGH STAKES, the practical
consequences of mistakenly acting on the premise that neither would get
off the waitlist are much greater.
See Doerfler, supra note 61, at 544 (using similar examples). These examples are
modeled on the so-called Bank Case, imagined by Keith DeRose. See Keith DeRose,
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 913,
913 (1992) (demonstrating a similar pattern of usage for “knowledge” and its cognates).
95 This discussion draws freely from Doerfler, supra note 61.
94
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Technical explanations of the above speech pattern vary. 96
Regardless, what these and other examples bring out is a
straightforward connection between epistemic confidence or
justification and practical interests. On any of the prevailing technical
explanations, it is appropriate to say that something is “clear” only if
one has adequate epistemic confidence or justification as to that thing.
And, on any of those explanations, what counts as adequate confidence
or justification depends upon our practical interests. In low-stakes
situations, the truth of the proposition at issue (e.g., that the preferred
candidate will win) matters to the conversational participants only a
little. As such, what speakers and listeners demand in those situations
is just that someone who claims it is “clear” that that proposition obtains
have moderate epistemic confidence or justification concerning that
proposition. By contrast, in high-stakes situations, the truth of the
proposition in question matters a great deal to the parties involved. For
that reason, speakers and listeners demand in those situations that
claims of “clarity” have significantly more epistemic support.
By connecting epistemic confidence or justification and practical
interests, the way we use terms like “clear” suggests an already intuitive
link between epistemic and practical rationality. To be more precise, it
supports the principle that the epistemic confidence or justification
required to act on some premise increases or decreases in accordance
with the practical stakes.97 To illustrate, consider again the examples
above. In LOW STAKES, not only is it appropriate for the speaker to say
that it is “clear” that neither student will get off the waitlist, but also for
her to act accordingly, walking right past the seminar room. In HIGH
STAKES, by contrast, the increased cost of acting erroneously on the
premise that neither student would get off the waitlist requires that the
speaker be more cautious both about what she says and about what she
does.
Returning to the law, what this suggests is that adhering to a “6535 rule” or a “90-10 rule” across cases probably makes little sense. To
say that a statutory text is “clear” is, as with anything else, to say that
it is clear enough for present purposes.98 And because purposes vary
Compare DEROSE, supra note 92 (arguing that epistemic terms are context-sensitive
in a narrow, semantic sense) with Brown, supra note 92 (arguing that the pattern is
best explained by appeal to pragmatic factors).
97 See Doerfler, supra note 61, at 549; see also Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW.
U. L. REV. 859, 879 (1992) (describing this connection as “obvious”).
98 In this respect, “clear” behaves like any other gradable adjective. To say that a
basketball player is “tall,” for example, communicates one thing (e.g., that she is tall
96
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from case to case, it would be surprising for 65-35, 90-10, or any other
ratio to be exactly enough epistemic confidence or justification each and
every time. Perhaps in a run-of-the-mill statutory case, it would make
sense for a court to be satisfied with 65-35 after looking at just the
statutory text. But in a major case? Seems like there a court really
ought to consider additional sources of statutory meaning, even if doing
so would be especially costly.99
It’s worth underlining that the stakes-sensitivity of legal “clarity”
determinations follows from the way we use “clarity” generally. Richard
Re, for example, has argued similarly that what legal “clarity” requires
varies from context to context.100 According to Re, however, this contextto-context variation is a distinctly legal phenomenon. Re warns, for
instance, the “[c]ourts and even commentators sometimes … conflat[e]
legal clarity with linguistic ambiguity,” and that “legal clarity,” unlike
“linguistic clarity,” cannot be “assessed solely on the basis of empirical
observation.”101 Instead, Re insists, “legal clarity,” again, unlike
“linguistic clarity,” rests ultimately on “normative premises.”102 What
Re’s contrast between “legal clarity” and “linguistic clarity” misses is
that all “clarity” determination—whether “legal,” “linguistic,” or
whatever else—involve both non-normative and normative
considerations.103 Again, to say that such and such is “clear” is to say
that the thing at issue is clear enough for present purposes. This is true
whether one’s purposes involve attending a seminar or rendering a legal
decision. In either case, the question is whether one has the requisite
epistemic confidence or justification to act on the relevant premise. And
in either case, the answer to that question will depend on normative
considerations, which is to say the practical stakes.
for a basketball player), while saying that a gymnast is “tall” something else (e.g., that
she is tall for a gymnast). See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 92, at 35-37; see also Lawson,
supra note 96, at 860 (observing that the question of which standard of proof to impose
in a given statutory case “is inescapably normative, depending heavily on the end one
seeks to serve through interpretation”).
99 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 S. CT. REV. 231 (arguing that “plain meaning,” in the sense of
ordinary meaning, operates as a low-cost coordinating mechanism for judges in
“uninteresting” cases).
100 Re, infra note 16.
101 Id. at 1505. Here, Re also seems to be making the correct observation that linguistic
content only has legal significance insofar as the law makes that so.
102 Id.
103 See Lawson, supra note 96, at 863 (observing that “[f]rom an epistemological
perspective, every positive propositional claim of the form ‘the law is X’ is a factual
claim,” and, hence, subject to standards of proof).
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In addition to varying from case to case, stakes can also shift from
doctrine to doctrine. Pursuant to the canon of constitutional avoidance,
courts famously strain to read statutes in ways that let them avoid
answering constitutional questions.104 As Justice Holmes explained,
“declar[ing] an Act of Congress unconstitutional … is the gravest and
most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform” and so one
that demands great caution.105 Courts will, for that reason, adopt an
interpretation they deem less likely correct than some other if doing so
will let them avoid calling a statute’s constitutionality into question so
long as that less likely interpretation is at least “fairly possible,” which
is to say so long as the constitutionally concerning interpretation is not
“clearly” correct.106 In practice, “fairly possible” turns out to be an easy
threshold to satisfy, and so “clear” an especially difficult one—again,
courts in this area appear closer to 90-10 than 65-35.107 And given the
alleged “grav[ity]” of invalidation, this should come as no surprise.
Contrast this with the rule of lenity, a facially similar “clear” text
doctrine that operates very differently on the ground.108 Just as the
canon of constitutional avoidance tells courts to err in the direction of
constitutionality, the rule of lenity says that “where there is ambiguity
in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.”109
Despite this similarity, the rule of lenity does almost no work as applied,
requiring only that a court adopt a defendant-friendly interpretation “if,
after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, [that court] can

See infra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
106 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 See infra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22
(1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“But when choice has to be made between two readings of
what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is
clear and definite.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485
(1917) (“[B]efore a man can be punished as a criminal under the Federal law his case
must be plainly and unmistakably within the provisions of some statute ….” (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); see also United States v. Universal
C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“But when choice
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it
is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress
should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” (emphasis added));
Donnelley v. United States, 276 U.S. 505, 511 (1928) (recognizing “the familiar rule
that one may not be punished for crime against the United States unless the facts
shown plainly and unmistakably constitute an offense within the meaning of an act of
Congress” (emphasis added)).
104
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make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”110 In
ordinary criminal cases, courts thus appear much closer to 65-35 if not
51-49. As Intisar Raab has argued, one possible explanation for this
asymmetry is that courts have lost sight of some of the original
constitutional justifications for the rule.111 Regardless, that courts
apply this “clear” statement rule so much more casually suggests that,
as a matter of doctrine, the stakes of criminal cases are dramatically
lower than those of would-be constitutional ones.112
Whether courts should attend to differences in the practical
stakes of individual cases is a difficult question.113
Far less
controversial, though, is that courts may recognize differences between
classes of cases that are encoded in the positive law. As a strictly legal
matter, how clear a statute has to be to count as “clear” for avoidance
purposes is very different from what “clarity” requires for purposes of
lenity. This and similar differences reflect differences in the legally
attributed stakes—as a doctrinal matter, avoidance cases are a much
bigger deal than ordinary criminal cases. One may or may not agree
with that assessment, just as one may or may not agree with the familiar
doctrinal assessment that criminal cases have higher stakes than civil
cases.114 Either way, such implicit assignments of importance are a
familiar feature of the law. And so long as the importance assigned
varies from doctrine to doctrine, the idea of a universal standard for
what it takes to be “clear” is a non-starter.
Even if a universal standard is not to be had, though, courts still
need to know how clear a statutory text has to be to count as “clear” in
an individual case. Here then-Judge Kavanaugh expresses skepticism,
remarking that “[n]o case or canon of interpretation says that my 65-35
approach or my colleagues’ 90-10 or 55-45 approach is the correct one
(or even a better one).”115 Similarly, Judge Easterbrook remarks, “The
Rule of Lenity does not say how serious .. ambiguity must be” to trigger

Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
111 See Intisar A. Raab, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 201
(2018) (arguing that Roberts Court’s reluctance to apply the rule of lenity is owed in
part to its inattention to the liberty interests that underlie the doctrine).
112 But see infra Part III.B (considering an alternative explanation).
113 On the one hand, it seems psychologically implausible to expect courts not to attend
to such differences. On the other, there does seem to be something unjust about courts
treating some cases as more important than others.
114 See Doerfler, supra note 61, at 550.
115 Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 2138.
110
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the rule.116 But is that right? Remember, as construed, the rule of lenity
applies only if a court “can make no more than a guess” as to what the
statute means. That sounds a lot like 55-45, and not at all like 90-10.
Concededly, in other doctrinal areas, what “clarity” requires is
much more contested. In Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States,117
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, rejected an IRS interpretation
of a tax statute, reasoning that “in light of all the textual and structural
clues before us, we think it’s clear enough” that the IRS interpretation
is incorrect.118 As discussed above, to say that a text is “clear” is always
to say that it is clear enough for present purposes. Still, the apparent
implication of Justice Gorsuch’s phrasing was that “clear” within the
Chevron framework is a relatively easy threshold to satisfy. That same
day, the Court also issued its opinion in Pereira v. Sessions.119 There
again, the Court rejected an agency interpretation on the grounds that
the statute at issue was “clear,” appealing to text, context, and “common
sense.” 120 In dissent, Justice Alito accused the majority of “simply
ignoring Chevron,” arguing that the majority’s interpretation was
“textually permissible,” but that the choice between that interpretation
and the agency’s was “difficult” and so the agency ought to have
prevailed.121 Observing that “[i]n recent years, several Members of this
Court have questioned Chevron’s foundations,” Justice Alito closed by
insisting that “unless the Court has overruled Chevron in a secret
decision that has somehow escaped my attention, it remains good
law.”122
These and other cases indicate a push by some jurists to
understand “clarity” for Chevron purposes as less demanding than
previously thought.123 Notice, however, that Justice Alito’s comment in
Pereira indicates that this is a squarely doctrinal dispute. According to
Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 90.
138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018).
118 Id. at 2074.
119 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).
120 Id. at 2110.
121 Id. at 2121, 2129.
122 Id. at 2129.
123 Instructive here is Judge Raymond Kethledge’s recent remark that “as a judge, I
have never yet had occasion to find a statute ambiguous” under Chevron. Raymond
M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on
the Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 320 (2017). Charitably, Judge Kethledge’s
statement indicates not that he has enjoyed 90-10 confidence in every Chevron case
(epistemically implausible), but rather that his threshold for “clarity” is much lower
than that.
116
117
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Justice Alito, “Chevron’s foundations” establish that overturning an
administering agency’s interpretation is a big deal, and so a statute
must be quite clear for a court to do so. Justice Gorsuch, by contrast,
seems to think that, agency or no, courts have a duty to say what the
law is, and so a statute’s being “clear enough” is enough. Given Justice
Gorsuch’s and others’ noted skepticism toward “the premises that
underlie Chevron,”124 one fears, with Justice Alito, that Justice
Gorsuch’s gloss on Chevron constitutes a subtle (or not so subtle)
attempt to change the law.125 Either way, there is little reason to think
that courts are incapable of debating openly what Chevron’s premises
require, or, alternatively, whether those premises should be rejected. In
doctrinal areas subject to widespread disagreement, it may also be that
the law is simply underdetermined—for instance, there may be no
correct answer to the question how clear a statutory text has to be to
count as “clear” for Chevron purposes.126
Legal indeterminacy is,
however, a generic problem, which is to say there is little reason to think
that “clear” text doctrines are especially prone to indeterminacy.
Here it also helps to remember that to reject a “clear” text doctrine
like Chevron is to take a position in the corresponding debate rather
than to avoid it. Again, the basic idea of Chevron is that courts “play it
safe” by deferring to an administering agency when statutory meaning
is uncertain, which is to say that the cost of mistakenly reversing an
agency action is greater than the cost of mistakenly affirming it, either
individually or in the aggregate. Maybe that’s right, maybe it isn’t. But

Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2121 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Given the concerns raised by
some Members of this Court, it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an
appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have
implemented that decision. The proper rules for interpreting statutes and determining
agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord with constitutional
separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of the Judiciary.”).
125 In response to Wisconsin Central, one scholar remarked, “Perhaps the ‘clear enough’
standard will encourage circuit and district judges to lower their thresholds for finding
clarity closer to the 50-50 range, thus narrowing the scope of Chevron deference at step
one.” Chris Walker, Gorsuch’s “Clear Enough” & Kennedy’s Anti-”Reflexive Deference”:
Two Potential Limits on Chevron Deference, Notice & Comment (June 22, 2018),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/gorsuchs-clear-enough-kennedys-anti-reflexive-deference-twopotential-limits-on-chevron-deference/. See also Gillian Metzger, Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24-28 (2017)
(describing increasing skepticism toward Chevron and other “subconstitutional”
doctrines by Justice Gorsuch and others).
126 See Scalia, supra note 26, at 520-21 (calling Chevron’s “clarity” standard
“ambigu[ous],” predicting that “future battles” will be fought over the degree of clarity
required to satisfy the doctrine).
124
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to reject Chevron without having that discussion is just to act as if it
isn’t.127

B. Inevitably Biased Application
The other pervasive objection to “clear” text doctrines in general
is, as Abbe Gluck puts it, that “we have no coherent, cabined, objective,
or predictable definition” of “clarity” (or, conversely, “ambiguity”). 128
The result, as then-Judge Kavanaugh describes it, is that “judgments
about clarity versus ambiguity turn on little more than a judge’s
instincts,” making it difficult “for judges to ensure that they are
separating their policy views from what the law requires of them.”129
The problem these critics allege can be broken into two parts. The
first is that determinations whether a statutory text satisfies some
stipulated clarity threshold—say, 65-35—are largely unreasoned. The
second is that those determinations are (therefore) especially vulnerable
to policy-bias.
Start with the first. According to then-Judge Kavanaugh,
whether a statute is “clear” or not “turns out to be an entirely personal
question, one subject to a certain sort of ipse dixit.”130 As illustration,
he cited MCI v. AT&T,131 a case in which the question was whether the
Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) authority to “modify” a
rate-filing requirement for common carriers included the authority to
eliminate that requirement for all non-dominant long-distance
carriers.132 The Court held 5-3 that it did not. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia began by observing that “[v]irtually every dictionary we
are aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to change moderately or in
minor fashion.”133 From there, Justice Scalia reasoned that eliminating
the rate-filing requirement for such a large swath of long-distance
customers was “much too extensive” to constitute a mere “modification”
as it changed the statute “from a scheme of rate regulation in longTo return to an earlier analogy, to leave for the airport at whatever time seems
more likely than not to be early enough to make the flight is to act as if it is no worse
to miss the flight than to wait around at the gate.
128 Gluck, supra note 23 at 2063.
129 Id. at 2138-39.
130 Id. at 2142.
131 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
132 Id. at 220.
133 Id. at 225.
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distance common-carrier communications to a scheme of rate regulation
only where effective competition does not exist.”134 In dissent, Justice
Stevens emphasized that the Communications Act “gives the FCC
unusually broad discretion to meet new and unanticipated problems,”
and that, owed to new competition in the long-distance market,
mandatory filing for non-dominant carriers served “no useful purpose
and is actually counterproductive” in the FCC’s view.135 Responding to
the argument that “modify” includes only “minor” changes, Justice
Stevens observed that if the rate-filing section “is viewed as part of a
[larger] statute whose aim is to constrain monopoly power, the
Commission’s decision to exempt nondominant carriers is a rational and
‘measured’ adjustment to novel circumstances—one that remains
faithful to the core purpose” of that section.136 For these and other
reasons, Justice Stevens concluded that the FCC’s interpretation was,
at the very least, “permissibl[e]” and so ought to control under
Chevron.137
Whichever side got the better of the exchange in MCI, it can
hardly be described as unreasoned. Both Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens offer up familiar sorts interpretive arguments, explaining why
one reading is more likely correct than the other—or at least likely
enough (or not) for purposes of Chevron. Such arguments are exactly
what one would expect in any statutory case. Because MCI is a Chevron
case, the burden of persuasion is different— “clear,” as opposed to more
likely than not. The evidence put forward is, however, the same.
Another way of putting the point is that, in terms of reasoned decision
making, all that doctrines like Chevron do is increase the applicable
evidentiary threshold (as explained below, the story is slightly more
complicated for rules of evidence like the plain-meaning rule).138 Thus,
unless one is a skeptic about statutory interpretation in general, there
is little reason to think that decisions made under a “clarity” standard
are anything other than “rational.”139 In terms of “neutral[ity],

Id. at 231-32.
Id. at 235, 239.
136 Id. at 241.
137 Id. at 245.
138 See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
139 To their credit, Professor Gluck and Judge Easterbrook tilt in that direction,
decrying what Judge Easterbrook calls an “absence of method” in statutory
interpretation. See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 83; accord Gluck, supra note 23, at
2058 (expressing concern that “true formalism in statutory interpretation might be
impossible”).
134
135
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impartial[ity], and predictab[ility],”140 it is hard to see why 51-49 would
fare any better than, say, 65-35.
Professor Gluck (along with Judge Easterbrook) grounds her
pessimism in a discussion of Lockhart v. United States,141 a case that
involves the rule of lenity.142 This Article assesses Lockhart below.143
For now, it suffices to say that, as in MCI, both the majority and dissent
in that case (there, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan) each offer a wide
range of familiar interpretive arguments—exactly the sorts of
arguments one would expect to see even if the rule of lenity (or any other
“clear” text doctrine) were irrelevant to the case.
So why, then, does it seem to many that judgments about “clarity”
are “arbitrary,” a reflection of judicial “policy preference” as opposed to
the law? In part, that perception is probably owed to implicit
disagreements between judges in individual cases as to how clear a text
has to be to count as “clear.” As discussed above, whether “clarity” for
Chevron purposes requires 65-35 or 90-10 is a legal question that can
and must be subjected to legal argumentation. Be that as it may, judges
are not always good about debating such issues openly and explicitly. In
Wisconsin Central, for instance, Justice Gorsuch simply presupposes
that “clear enough” is enough for Chevron, rather than explaining why
“clarity” is not especially demanding under that doctrine. Insofar as
such disagreements remain implicit—which is to say unargued—it is
easy to see how one might think that something like differences in policy
preference are what explain them. What this suggests, however, is that
judges need to be open and honest about such doctrinal disagreements,
and not try to introduce indirectly their preferred view of the law.
In other part, though, this widespread perception is presumably
owed to some number of disagreements about “clarity” really being
disagreements about policy.144 Whether consciously or unconsciously,
judges (like the rest of us) occasionally exaggerate or understate the
likelihood of legal claims based upon their views of what would be

Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 2137.
136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
142 See Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of
Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They
Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 193 (2017); Easterbrook, supra note
26, at 90.
143 See infra notes 228-239 and accompanying text.
144 See, e.g., Solan, supra note 10, at 865 (“[A]t times courts themselves may not be
sincere when they hold that the language of a statute is clear.”)
140
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good.145 So long as judges care about their reputations, the degree to
which they exaggerate or understate in this way is constrained. 146 If a
reading of some statute is clearly correct, a willful or motivated judge
could mischaracterize that reading as merely “likely” without serious
reputational harm.147 To mischaracterize it as “clearly incorrect” would,
however, result in significant criticism.148 Assuming that’s right, one
should expect that judges will sometimes exaggerate or understate the
likelihood of different readings in close cases, moving readings above or
below the threshold of “clear” depending on what advances their
partisan interests. Whether an agency action is deemed “clearly”
precluded, for example, may indeed turn on who is in the White
House.149
As the above suggests, though, willfulness or motivated reasoning
pose a problem in close cases generally.150 In an ordinary statutory case,
a judge could, without embarrassing herself, mischaracterize a merely
See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULLETIN
489 (1990).
146 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 GEO. L.J.
159, 182 (2016) (observing that if “all judges always act solely so as to promote the
interests of their political party,” then normative interpretive theory is pointless);
Solan, supra note 10, at 866 (“Surely our understanding of language does some work
in limiting the range of plausible interpretations of legal texts, and a great deal of work
at that.”).
147 See Doerfler, supra note 74, at 840-41. Importantly, the suggestion here is not that
judges are reputation maximizers. Considerations like the practical significance of a
given case might, for example, affect a judge’s willingness to incur reputational harm,
or, alternatively, her blindness to the reputational harm that might result from
adopting a particular reading. Similarly, the argument here need not assume that the
only determiner of judicial reputation is apparent conformity of judicial decision
making with what the law is. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the
Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 627-31 (2000)
(considering various possible determiners of judicial reputation).
148 At least assuming the relevant audience is not similarly willful or motivated.
149 On the assumption that the Supreme Court cases are closer on average than circuit
court cases, this might help explain the empirical observation that Chevron constrains
the latter more reliably than the former. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker,
Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017) (“Although Chevron may
not have much of an effect on agency outcomes at the Supreme Court (based on prior
empirical studies of the Court), it seems to matter markedly in the circuit courts.”).
150 The following argument assumes that would-be legal disputes are distributed
evenly across the interpretive probability spectrum, both in terms of numerosity and
practical significance. This assumption is based upon the “principle of insufficient
reason.” See VERMEULE, supra note 64, at 173–75 (observing that it is rational under
certain circumstances to assume that unknown probabilities are equal). Ex ante, there
is no reason to believe that there are more, or more consequential, practical disputes
that turn on questions of statutory interpretation near the 51-49 line, as opposed to
the 65-35 line (or any other).
145
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likely interpretation as “unlikely.” And because it is an ordinary case—
that is, a case in which the evidentiary threshold is more likely than
not—that would be enough to alter the outcome. Here again the
question is why think that judges would have an easier time
exaggerating or understating the likelihood of various readings if the
epistemic threshold were, say, 65-35, as opposed to 51-49? In any
statutory case, there has to be some line past which the moving party
prevails.151 And wherever that line happens to be, the risk of willfulness
or motivated reasoning will be greater the closer a case is to that line.152
Worth mentioning here, the degree to which textual “clarity”
judgments are vulnerable to motivated reasoning may depend upon the
way in which “clarity” questions are framed. In an intriguing empirical
study, Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior, and Anup Malani found that
when asked directly whether a statutory text is “ambiguous,”
interpreters’ judgments were strongly biased by their respective policy
preferences..153 By contrast, when interpreters were asked whether
“ordinary readers would agree about the statute’s meaning,” the effect
of the interpreter’s policy preference disappeared. 154 Based upon this
finding, Professors Farnsworth, Guzior, and Malani argue that legal
doctrines that assign significance to textual “ambiguity” ought to turn
on what they call “external” judgment, which is to say judgments about
how ordinary readers would understand the text at issue), and not
“internal” judgments, which is to say judgments about how the judge
understands the statute.
In terms of doctrine, courts are neither clear nor consistent about
whether “ambiguity,” or, alternatively, “clarity” determinations are
supposed to be “internal” or “external.” Sometimes, courts hint that
what matters is how an “ordinary” person would understand statutory

Remedies aside, outcomes of legal disputes are binary, not scalar.
David Pozen suggests that “clarity” standards might be especially vulnerable to
motivated reasoning because claims of interpretive “necessit[y] … allow advocates to
hide from themselves the ineradicable contingency and ambiguity of legal meaning
and the ineradicable discretion and responsibility that follow.” David E. Pozen,
Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 936 (2016). Even if that’s right, one
would expect its marginal significance to be limited by the textualist turn in statutory
interpretation. The reason is that, following that turn, courts can already disavow
responsibility for it decision in a statutory case (e.g., “Congress made me do it!”)
without having to blame the “clear” text.
153 Farnsworth, Guzior, & Malani, supra note 9, at 259-60.
154 Id.
151
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language.155 Other times, however, the suggestion is that what courts
care about is how an “ordinary Member of Congress would have read”
the text in question.156 Most of the time, though, courts give no
indication that how some other person would understand a statutory
text is of interest—the question instead is just what did Congress
mean?157 As a constitutional matter, the guarantee of “fair notice”
grounded in the Due Process Clause would seem to recommend the
“ordinary” person frame.158 Add to this the practical advantages
identified by Professors Farnsworth, Guzior, and Malani, and it seems
that courts would do best to resolve any doctrinal inconsistency or
underdeterminacy in that direction. This is especially so if, as most do,
one regards congressional intent as something of a “construct,” in which
case courts cannot avoid defining the appropriate epistemic perspective
from which to evaluate a statutory text.159 But even if not, it seems both
legally plausible and normatively desirable that a statutory text is only
clear enough to count as “clear” if an “ordinary” or “reasonable” person
would regard it as “clear” (attending to the practical stakes, and so on).
In the above respect, the various clarity doctrines discussed here
contrast with other doctrines, like qualified immunity, that courts more
consistently characterize as relating to the perspective of some specific
E.g., Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory
construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption
that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.”).
156 E.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157 See, e.g., F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 294 (2012) (“[O]ur task is to determine
what Congress meant by ‘actual.’”); U. S. Dep’t of State v. Washington Post Co., 456
U.S. 595, 599 (1982) (“The language of Exemption 6 sheds little light on what Congress
meant by ‘similar files.’”); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 143 (1914) (“[I]t is
essential to understand what Congress meant in the use of that term ….”).
158 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“A conviction fails to
comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited ….”); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in
our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice ... of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment ....”).
159 Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 359, 362 (2005) (observing
that because “Congress is a collective entity,” the “concept of legislative ‘intent’ is
obviously something of a construct for textualists and intentionalists alike,” and that
textualists and intentionalists both limit interpreters to “publicly available” evidence).
On such an approach, a judge would presumably limit herself to reasonably available
information as well as reasonably shared normative and non-normative assumptions.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle (manuscript)
(discussing the relevance of overlapping linguistic intuitions to theories of
interpretation operating with an “objectified” conception of congressional intent).
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actor (for example, a police officer). Unlike Chevron or the rule of lenity,
qualified immunity and others like it assign significance not so much to
textual clarity, but instead to the clarity of the law more generally.
Qualified immunity doctrine, for example, assigns significance to
whether a plaintiff’s right is “clearly established,”160 determination of
which involves, in practice careful attention to judicial precedent. 161
And although that doctrine is typically stated as concerning the
perspective of a “reasonable person,”162 in application and subsequent
discussion, courts make clear that the “reasonable person” in question
is a reasonable executive official.163 In a recent, insightful piece on legal
clarity in general, Re argues that such doctrines thus have less to do
with judicial accuracy in answering some legal question than with the
predictability that some actor or actors would converge on a particular
answer.164
Re’s diagnosis is entirely plausible given qualified
immunity’s stated purpose, namely affording “fair warning” to
officers.165
While it goes beyond the scope of this Article, there may be deep
theoretical reasons why textual clarity doctrines of the sort discussed
here systematically concern accuracy rather than predictability, to use
Re’s terminology.166 Regardless, as a matter of positive law, it is at least
noteworthy doctrines concerning precedential clarity and the like appear
to have different aims.

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct.
548, 551 (2017) (per curiam )).
161 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (“We do not require a case
directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.”).
162 Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quoting White, 137 S. Ct. at 551).
163 See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014) (“[A] defendant cannot
be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were
sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have
understood that he was violating it.” (emphasis added)).
164 Re, supra note 16, at 1502. In addition to qualified immunity, Re also discusses
§ 2254(d)(1), which imposes an analogous “clearly established” requirement for federal
habeas review of state court convictions. See id. at 1522-31.
165 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-40 (2002) (quoting United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1997)). For a critique of this rationale, see William
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 72-74 (2018).
166 See Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979,
1020-43 (2017) (arguing that Congress’s failure to form actual, shared communicative
intentions entails that statutory meaning is a function of the information available to
all audiences of the relevant statute).
160
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*
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As indicated above, addressing concerns about willfulness or
motivated reasoning is comparatively easy when it comes to rules of
decision.
With respect to the search for statutory meaning, rules of
decision have no bearing on what evidence a court should consider.
Instead, all that such doctrines do is increase the degree of epistemic
confidence or justification needed for a court to enforce some reading.
Whether, for example, a case falls within Chevron’s domain has no
bearing on what evidence of statutory meaning a court should consider,
or, in turn, the “rationality” or vulnerability to policy bias of its
interpretive reasoning.
By contrast, with rules of evidence, the story is slightly more
complicated. Under a rule of evidence, the evidence of statutory
meaning a court may consider is potentially different and somewhat
more limited than it would be if that doctrine did not apply. A court
may, for example, judge it appropriate to enforce a statutory reading
under the plain-meaning rule after considering only the statutory text,
to the exclusion of other pertinent, non-textual evidence. Such a
judgment might fairly be characterized as less “rational”167 than one
arrived at after considering the excluded evidence in addition.
Generally speaking, judgments are more accurate and more stable the
more evidence upon which they are based. And at least insofar as nontextual evidence is excluded on grounds of, say, cost,168 a judgment
arrived at under the plain-meaning rule is not only less accurate, but
also more vulnerable to willfulness or motivated reasoning than an
ordinary interpretive judgment. The reason is that the evidentiary basis
for that judgment is comparatively thin. That tradeoff may be worth it.
Sometimes “cheap and good enough” is the right approach. Still, it is
important to recognize that with rules of decision like Chevron, there
really is no tradeoff in terms of “rationality.” With rules of evidence like
the plain-meaning rule there is some tradeoff, at least if the justification
is cost.

III. APPLICATIONS

167
168

Though probably not as “irrational.”
As opposed to, say, psychological bias. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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Parts I and II dealt with “clear” text doctrines mostly in the
abstract. This Part is more concrete, discussing in detail four familiar
“clear” text doctrines: the canon of constitutional avoidance, the rule of
lenity, the “plain meaning” rule as it applies to legislative history, and
Chevron. As the discussion illustrates, whether a specific doctrine is
best understood as a rule of evidence or, instead, as a rule of decision is
sometimes not obvious. Correspondingly, whether or in what form these
doctrines should be preserved can be a difficult question.
This Part also highlights how sorting different “clear” text
doctrines into different categories can help settle longstanding questions
about the order in which such doctrines should be applied. As it
explains, because rules of decision help courts deal with uncertainty that
remains after the search for statutory meaning, courts should almost
always apply rules of evidence—which organize that search—before
applying the former type of doctrine. As this Part explains, this simple
observation leads to some surprising results, including, for example,
that courts should afford agencies Skidmore deference before deciding
whether a statute is “clear” for purposes of Chevron, or that courts
should consider legislative history when determining whether Congress
has “clearly” abrogated state sovereign immunity.

A. Constitutional Avoidance
In its “modern” form, the canon of constitutional avoidance
instructs courts to adopt a less natural but “fairly possible”
interpretation of a statute if giving that statute its “most natural”
interpretation would raise “substantial constitutional questions.”169
The stated justifications for the doctrine vary slightly. Sometimes
courts ground the avoidance canon in “due respect” for Congress as a
“coordinate branch of the government.”170 Other times, they emphasize
the practical wisdom of adjudicating constitutional questions only if
necessary.171 The overall sentiment, though, seems best captured by
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994); see also U.S. ex rel
Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co, 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (conditioning
avoidance on “grave and doubtful constitutional questions”).
170 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879).
171 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 463 U.S. 147, 157 (1983) (recognizing “the
Court’s prudential policy of construing acts of Congress so as to avoid the unnecessary
decision of serious constitutional questions” (emphasis added)); N.L.R.B. v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979) (same).
169
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Justice Holmes’s remark, mentioned above, that declaring an act of
Congress constitutionally invalid is a “grave” and “delicate” duty and so
one that courts should approach with great caution.172
Looking at these various statements, the canon of constitutional
avoidance is characterized most straightforwardly as a rule of decision.
Again, the motivating idea is that declaring a statute unconstitutional
is a really big deal. And from this, courts apparently infer that they
should address constitutional questions only if really sure that a statute
means what they think that it means. But does that make sense? Does
the “grav[ity] and “delica[cy]” of judicial review really get one to the
avoidance canon in its modern form? At the outset, it is worth
mentioning that taking an especially cautious approach to statutory
interpretation is only one way for courts to “play it safe” in this space.
Alternatively or in addition, courts could take a similarly cautious
approach to constitutional interpretation, declaring invalid an act of
Congress only if really sure that the Constitution means what the court
thinks that it means.173 Beyond that, there is the familiar question of
why the avoidance canon should be triggered by mere constitutional
“questions,” as opposed to actual unconstitutionality.174 In terms of
avoiding unnecessary denunciation of Congress, the latter would seem
to suffice.175
Even retreating to “classic” avoidance, questions about the canon
remain.176 As discussed above, the premise of any rule of decision is that
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
Cf. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
174 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (arguing that conditioning avoidance on
constitutional questions “create[s] a judge-made constitutional ‘penumbra’”); see also
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (“[I]t is by no
means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a
constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on
constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute.”).
175 The switch from “classic” to “modern” avoidance appears to have been motivated by
the concern that “when a court engages in classical avoidance, it provides what
amounts to an advisory opinion on a constitutional issue.” Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1204–05
(2006).
176 Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance As Interpretation and As Remedy, 114 Mich.
L. Rev. 1275, 1279 (2016) (“Under the classic doctrine of avoidance, judges only avoided
interpretations that would actually make the statute unconstitutional.”); see also
Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 148 (Holmes, J., concurring) (“[A]s between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the
other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.”).
172
173
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the costs of mistake are asymmetric. With the avoidance canon, the
thought seems to be that misinterpreting a statute and then declaring
it invalid is worse than misreading that statute and then enforcing it.
Maybe that’s right. Misreading a statute and then declaring it invalid
does seem like adding insult to injury.177 But even if so, the more
difficult question is how much worse is it, really? In practice, courts
bend over backwards to avoid constitutional questions, enforcing
“strained,”178 “implausible,”179 or even “tortured”180 interpretations of
statutes.
Here, the easiest contemporary illustration is Bond v. United
States.181 In that case, a Pennsylvania woman had spread dangerous
chemicals on the “car door, mailbox, and door knob” of her “closest
friend” upon learning of an extramarital affair between the friend and
the woman’s husband.182 Federal prosecutors subsequently charged the
woman with two counts of possessing a “chemical weapon,” in violation
of the federal statute implementing the near-identically worded
international Convention on Chemical Weapons.183 The statute defines
“chemical weapon” in relevant part as “[a] toxic chemical and its
precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under
this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a
purpose.”184 “Toxic chemical,” in turn, is defined as “any chemical which
through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”185 Lastly, the
statute defines “purposes not prohibited by this chapter” as “[a]ny
On the other hand, misinterpreting and then enforcing a statute involves giving
force to a policy with no constitutional legitimacy … also not great.
178 John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP.
CT. REV. 223, 254 (2000) ([T]he Court itself has often recognized that the avoidance
canon may compel acceptance of a ‘strained’ interpretation ….”).
179 William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 865 (2001) (“[T]he most common and persuasive objection to
the avoidance canon is that it leads to implausible constructions of statutory language
….”).
180 Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme
Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2015) (“[Aggressive
application of the canon] leads to tortured constructions of statutes that bear little
resemblance to laws actually passed by the elected branches.”).
181 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
182 Id. at 2085.
183 Id. at 2085-86; see also 18 U.S.C. § 229 (a)(1); Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 29, 1997, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317; S. Res. 75, 105th Cong. (1997).
184 18 U.S.C. § 229F (1)(A).
185 Id. § 229F (8)(A).
177
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peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research,
medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity,” and other specific
purposes.186 The chemicals used by the woman in the attacks were,
concededly, “toxic to humans and, in high enough doses, potentially
lethal.”187 At the same time, it was “undisputed” that the defendant “did
not intend to kill” the friend, and instead “hoped” that the friend would
“touch the chemicals and develop an uncomfortable rash.”188
Following her conviction, the defendant argued on appeal that
federal criminalization of this sort of domestic assault exceeded
Congress’s enumerated powers and invaded powers reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment.189 In so arguing, the defendant seemed
to call into question the century-old precedent Missouri v. Holland,190
which stated that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about
the validity of the statute” that implements it “as a necessary and proper
means to execute the powers of the Government.”191 The Supreme
Court, however, avoided the constitutional issue, holding instead that
the statute did not reach the defendant’s conduct. The statute’s
definitional sections notwithstanding, Chief Justice Roberts explained
that the “ordinary meaning” of the phrase “chemical weapon” calls to
mind “chemical warfare,” not “spreading irritating chemicals on [a]
doorknob.”192 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized moreover that our
“constitutional structure” leaves the prosecution of “purely local crimes”
to the states, and so one should hesitate to attribute to Congress the
intention to “upset the Constitution’s balance between national and
local power” by “defin[ing] as a federal crime conduct readily denounced
as criminal by the States.”193
Whatever one thinks of the Chief Justice’s reasoning, it seems
likely that the Court would have held that the statute applied to the
defendant’s conduct absent the extraordinary circumstances: The
chemicals that possessed and used were “potentially lethal” and so
seemingly “toxic,” and her “purpose” was evidently not “peaceful.”
Q.E.D.194 Indeed, the Chief Justice seemed to concede as much in his
Id. § 229F (7)(A).
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 2086.
190 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
191 Id. at 432.
192 Id. at 2090.
193 Id. at 2083, 2090, 2093 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194 Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“End of statutory analysis, I would have
thought.”).
186
187
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opinion, remarking that an otherwise “clear” statutory text can be made
“ambigu[ous]” by the “deeply serious consequences of adopting” its
otherwise most natural reading.195
The practice of straining to avoid constitutional questions that
one sees in Bond and other, similar cases would plausibly be justifiable
if the cost of declaring a statute invalid based on a misreading were
dramatically greater than the alternative.196
If erroneous nonenforcement truly were catastrophic, then requiring something
approaching absolute certainty concerning statutory meaning before
declaring a statute invalid would seem to make both practical and
epistemic sense. And yet, how plausible is that? In terms of
constitutional duties, interpreting statutes faithfully and accurately is
also incredibly important. And from an inter-branch perspective, it is
less than obvious why Congress would prefer systematic
misinterpretation to the occasional erroneous non-enforcement.197 Even
conceding that, from Congress’s perspective, erroneous non-enforcement
is worse than mere misreading,198 to make sense of cases like Bond, one
would, again, have to claim that it is so much worse that it is worth
avoiding at almost any cost in terms of interpretive accuracy.
Qua rule of decision, then, the classic avoidance canon is
conceivably justified, assuming an easy-to-satisfy threshold for
“clarity.”199 Getting to modern avoidance, or to the now-familiar, very
demanding “clarity” threshold seems, however, much more doubtful.
Another approach would be to reconceive the canon of
constitutional avoidance as a rule of evidence. According to Justice
Scalia, for example, the avoidance canon rests on the “reasonable
presumption” that “between competing plausible interpretations of a
statutory text,” Congress “did not intend the alternative which raises

Id. at 2090.
See Doerfler, supra note 61, at 552 (explaining that “courts’ assessment of what is
‘fairly possible’ in [modern] cases is plausibly (and reasonably) affected by the
perceived practical stakes”).
197 See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 179, at 2113 (arguing that aggressive application
of the modern avoidance canon “can be even more antidemocratic than outright
invalidation, by putting in place a law that Congress did not want and that, because
of various inertial forces laced into our constitutional system, Congress will not be able
to change”).
198 For instance, because constitutional holdings have broader ramifications for
Congress’s ability to legislate generally.
199 Or maybe better, a “best guess” standard, with a slight thumb on the scale in favor
of actually constitutional readings. See infra notes 240-244 and accompanying text.
195
196
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serious constitutional doubts.”200 One way of interpreting Justice
Scalia’s characterization is as saying that whether an interpretation
“raises serious constitutional doubts” is simply evidence of statutory
meaning.201 That seems plausible. Members of Congress swear an oath
to uphold the Constitution.202 It is thus only charitable to assume that
Congress intends readings of statutes that are consistent with its
constitutional authority. Even with respect to constitutional questions,
one might argue that members of Congress take (or should take) a
cautious approach to exercising its legislative powers.203 On this line of
reasoning, courts should assume that Congress “plays it safe” when it
legislates, enacting laws that are clearly within its enumerated powers.
In so doing, Congress would avoid accidental constitutional excess, even
if at the expense of legislating less expansively than it otherwise
could.204
Suppose one finds that story persuasive. Is that enough to rescue
the avoidance canon in its modern form? Maybe. As discussed in Part
I, rules of evidence like the one proposed here are epistemically puzzling.
Ordinarily, evidence that is helpful to an investigation should be
considered as a matter of course. In this case, assuming uncertain
constitutionality is evidence of statutory meaning, the question is why
not consider it in every case, weighing it against other evidence like
statutory structure or apparent purpose? Understood as a rule of
evidence, what the canon of constitutional avoidance instructs courts to
do is to determine whether a statute has a “clear” meaning based upon
evidence other than uncertain constitutionality (or, in the case of classic
avoidance, actual unconstitutionality). Only if the answer is “no” should
courts go on to consider whether one of the seemingly available readings
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
The alternate interpretation is that Justice Scalia is claiming that Congress prefers
that courts resolve statutory unclarity in ways that avoid serious constitutional
concerns. So interpreted, Justice Scalia’s characterization would be analogous to the
doctrinal justification for Chevron, which is that Congress intends that courts resolve
statutory unclarity in administrative cases by deferring to administering agencies. See
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(explaining agency deference by appeal to implicit congressional delegation).
202 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
203 See Fallon, supra note 158 (arguing that attribution of attitudes to Congress as such
is an unavoidably normative task).
204 Another “advantage” of conceiving of the avoidance canon as a rule of evidence is
that it would provide a principled justification for the current judicial practice of
applying that canon when determining whether a statutory text counts as “clear” for
Chevron purposes. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see also infra notes 260-281 and
accompanying text.
200
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would raise “substantial constitutional questions” (or, alternatively, be
constitutionally invalid). Again, the question is what would justify that
conditional structure?
One possibility is cost. If figuring out whether some reading
would raise “substantial constitutional questions” were especially costly,
courts would potentially be justified in asking that question only after
attending to other, less expensive evidence of statutory meaning. Is that
plausible, though?
Conceivably, actually answering “substantial
constitutional questions” takes serious work. For that reason, costefficiency might provide an alternate justification for the avoidance
canon in its classical form.205 But merely identifying “substantial”
questions?
Another, more promising possibility is psychological bias. If
uncertain constitutionality is probative of statutory meaning, but, for
reasons of psychological bias, judges are disposed to overweight it, it
could make sense for judges to consider whether a reading would raise
“substantial constitutional questions” only if other, less biasing evidence
is insufficient to rule it out. And that really does seem plausible. Given
the alleged “gravity” of judicial review, it is all too realistic that judges
would overweight uncertain constitutionality in an unconscious effort to
avoid having to even contemplate declaring an act of Congress invalid.206
As a check against that bias, courts might be justified, then, in asking
whether some reading is “clearly” correct wholly apart from any
constitutional questions it might raise, considering apparent
constitutionality only if the answer is “no.”
Notice, however, that even if reconceiving the avoidance canon as
a rule of evidence helps make sense of the doctrine being triggered by
mere constitutional “questions” or “doubts,” it does so at the cost of
reducing substantially the legal significance of constitutional
questionability or doubtfulness. By analogy, the plain meaning rule
conditions consideration of legislative history upon textual unclarity,
but says nothing about the weight of legislative history in relation to
other sources—a court might, for example, determine that legislative
history is moderately supportive of reading A, but decide that the
totality of evidence supports reading B. The canon of constitutional
avoidance, by contrast, traditionally treats apparent constitutionality as
Though remember the tradeoffs in terms of willfulness and motivated reasoning
that would be involved. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
206 Or, for that matter, to avoid having to do the hard work involved in answering
“substantial constitutional questions.”
205
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a trumping consideration if courts consider it at all. Treating apparent
constitutionality as a trump makes sense if erring in that direction
constitutes “playing it safe” under conditions of uncertainty. If,
however, apparent constitutionality is merely evidence of statutory
meaning, it would likely be outweighed in various cases by various other
familiar sources such as text, structure, and apparent purpose. Put
differently, reconceiving the avoidance canon as a rule of evidence might
get one from classic to modern avoidance, but it would probably do so at
the expense of rendering the canon dramatically less consequential.

B. Lenity
The rule of lenity famously instructs courts to resolve any
unclarity in a criminal statute in favor of the defendant. 207 Like
Chevron, the rule of lenity seems hard to understand as a rule of
evidence. Recent attitudinal shifts notwithstanding, the political
climate in the United States has, at least since the 1980s, supported an
unusually harsh approach to criminal sentencing,208 as well as an
expansive attitude toward criminalization.209 Given this reality, that a
reading of a contemporary criminal statute is relatively harsh probably
makes it more likely, not less, to be the one that Congress intended.210
So what about uncertainty management? Characterizing lenity
as a rule of decision fits neatly with the rule’s stated justifications.
Other than historical pedigree,211 courts invoking the rule of lenity tend
See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (“In these
circumstances—where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the
Government’s position is unambiguously correct—we apply the rule of lenity and
resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant’s] favor.”).
208 Unusual in relation to the global statistical norms. See Yes, U.S. Locks People Up
at a Higher Rate than Any Other Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-lockspeople-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/.
209 See DOUGLAS HUSAK OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3
(2008) (describing the “explosive growth in the size and scope of the criminal law”).
210 This is true even for those concerned with “objectified” intent, see supra note 81 and
accompanying text, insofar as one infers just from the harshness and scope of
contemporary criminal statutes a disposition towards the punitive rather than the
lenient.
211 See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 310 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing the “the ancient requirement that
criminal statutes speak plainly and unmistakably” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
207
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to cite two considerations in support. The first is that it is the role of
“legislatures, not courts, [to] define criminal liability.”212 The second is
that criminal defendants are entitled to “adequate notice of the conduct
that the law prohibits.”213
On defining criminal liability, the thought here seems to be that
the criminal law is, in some places, either underdetermined or
unknowable.214 For that reason, holding a defendant liable in one of
those places would, either de jure or de facto, amount to law declaration
rather than law identification.
The connection with managing
uncertainty is straightforward, given that way of thinking. Assuming
there is an illegitimacy cost to convicting a defendant for conduct not
knowably prohibited at the time, it would be safer for a court to allow
conviction only if it actually knows that the conduct was prohibited.
The same story applies to adequate notice. There, the illegitimacy
of convicting a defendant for conduct not knowably prohibited at the
time has less to do with separation of powers than with due process and
basic fairness. Here again, though, the easiest way to avoid that sort of
illegitimate conviction is to permit conviction for conduct a court knows
is prohibited. Which is to say, conduct “clearly” proscribed by the
statute.215
Even if the rule of lenity is justified in some form, though, maybe
the more interesting question is how demanding a “clarity” threshold
the rule can sustain. As mentioned above, the doctrine as presently
construed applies only if a court “can make no more than a guess” as to
statutory meaning.216 In a criminal case, in other words, a statute is
“clear” at something much closer to 55-45 than to 90-10—and, as a
result, “recent judicial applications of the rule appear to be rare.” 217
What this easy-to-satisfy threshold suggests, then, is that, even if erring
in a defendant’s favor constitutes “playing it safe” in a criminal case,
very little caution is required because the stakes in such cases are low.
That might seem surprising. As suggested by, for example, the
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990).
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 397 (2005).
214 See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
215 Someone with consequentialist leanings might object that any illegitimacy costs
associated with conviction for not-knowably-prohibited conduct is offset by the welfare
gains of punishing socially harmful behavior. See Daniel Epps, The Consequences of
Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1089-92 (2015) (describing such
objections).
216 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
217 Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2427 (2006).
212
213
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increased burden of proof for criminal conviction or the relative severity
of criminal sanctions, a seeming premise of our legal system is that
criminal conviction is a really big deal.218 If that’s right, though, what
accounts for the relative ease with which courts declare criminal
statutes “clear,” thereby triggering severe criminal sanctions, and so on?
To understand how little work lenity does, consider two cases, one
an old chestnut219 and another more recent. First, in the familiar Smith
v. United States,220 the defendant had traded a fully automatic MAC-10
assault rifle to an undercover officer for two ounces of cocaine.221 Among
other offenses, the defendant was subsequently charged with and
convicted of “using” a firearm “during and in relation to ... [a] drug
trafficking crime.”222 On appeal, the defendant argued that use for
purposes of exchange did not constitute “us[e]” of a firearm in the
relevant sense.223 6-3, the Supreme Court held that it did. Writing for
the majority, Justice O’Connor observed that various dictionaries as
well as previous caselaw defined “to use” broadly to include “to employ”
and “to derive service from.”224 Reasoning that the defendant had
plainly “employed” and “derived service from” his firearm, the statute,
she concluded, plainly applied to his conduct. 225 In dissent, Justice
Scalia marshalled various ordinary language examples in support of the
proposition that “[t]o [‘]use[‘] an instrumentality ordinarily means to use
it for its intended purpose.”226 Moving from the general to the specific,
Justice Scalia inferred that, as used in the statute, “us[e]” of a firearm
was most naturally read as use as a weapon.227 Bolstering his legal
conclusion that the defendant in the case ought to prevail, Justice Scalia
added that, “[e]ven if the reader does not consider the issue to be as clear
as I do, he must at least acknowledge, I think, that it is eminently
See Doerfler, supra note 61, at 550.
Or maybe better, middle-aged.
220 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
221 Id. at 225-26.
222 Id. at 226-27 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(23)
(imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment if the “firearm”
used is a “machinegun”); 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (defining “machinegun” to include
automatic weapons).
223 Smith, 508 U.S. at 228.
224 Id. at 228-29 (quoting Astor v. Merritt, 111 U.S. 202, 213 (1884)).
225 Id. at 229. Justice O’Connor also emphasized that there was no indication that
Congress intended to deviate from the “ordinary” meaning of the term at issue. Id. at
228.
226 Id. at 242 (“When someone asks, “Do you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring whether
you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he
wants to know whether you walk with a cane.”).
227 Id. at 242-44.
218
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debatable—and that is enough, under the rule of lenity, to require
finding for the [defendant] here.”228
Second, in the more recent Lockhart v. United States,229 the
defendant had been convicted of possession of child pornography.230
Based upon a previous conviction for sexual abuse of his then-53-yearold girlfriend, the defendant was subsequently deemed subject to a 10year mandatory minimum sentence applicable to offenders with “a prior
conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual
abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or
ward.”231 On appeal, the defendant argued that his prior conviction was
not for “sexual abuse … involving a minor or ward,” and so the
mandatory minimum did not apply.232 Again, the Supreme Court
disagreed, this time 6-2. Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor
explained that the qualifier “involving a minor or ward” attached only
to the last item on the list of offenses, namely “abusive sexual conduct,”
meaning that the defendants prior conviction for “sexual abuse” of an
adult was sufficient to trigger the mandatory minimum.233 In defense
of that reading, Justice Sotomayor offered ordinary language
analogies,234 as well as an appeal to something called the “rule of the
last antecedent.”235 Justice Sotomayor also drew support from “nearly
identical[ly]” worded statutes in which it was clear that “sexual abuse”
meant sexual abuse of any kind.236 In dissent, Justice Kagan argued
that the qualifier “involving a minor or ward” took scope over the entire
list of triggering offenses.237 In support of her reading, Justice Kagan,
too, offered colorful (and topical) analogies, observing, for example, that
“a real estate agent [who] promised to find a client ‘a house, condo, or
apartment in New York’” would not have fulfilled with her promise by

Id. at 246.
136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
230 Id. at 961.
231 Id. at 961-62 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)).
232 Id. at 962.
233 Id. at 961.
234 Id. at 963 (“For example, imagine you are the general manager of the Yankees and
you are rounding out your 2016 roster. You tell your scouts to find a defensive catcher,
a quick-footed shortstop, or a pitcher from last year’s World Champion Kansas City
Royals. It would be natural for your scouts to confine their search for a pitcher to last
year’s championship team, but to look more broadly for catchers and shortstops.”).
235 Id. at 962-63 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)).
236 Id. at 964 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-43).
237 Id. at 969.
228
229
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sending “information about condos in Maryland or California.”238 Like
Justice Sotomayor, she also attempted to support her position with a
purported principle of positive law—this time, the “series-qualifier
canon.”239 And finally, like Justice Scalia in Smith, Justice Kagan
appealed to lenity, reasoning that even if the case were “less clear” than
her opinion suggested, surely the statute was at least ambiguous and so
the defendant ought to prevail.240
Again, one reading of cases like Smith and Lockhart is that judges
regard criminal cases as having remarkably low stakes. In each case,
even if one is disposed to agree with the majority’s reading, it is hard to
suggest that the majority’s arguments are dramatically more forceful
than those of the dissent. But if that’s right, it is correspondingly
difficult to imagine that the majority in either case was substantially
more confident—let alone reasonably more confident—in their reading
than 55-45. And, again, if 55-45 is enough to count as “clear” for
purposes of lenity, convicting someone of a criminal offense is being
treated by courts as akin to giving up on an uninteresting seminar.
Another, more charitable explanation of what is going on in those
cases, though, is that, although accepting that the stakes of criminal
cases are high, courts regard the costs of mistake as closer to symmetric
than our legal tradition might suggest.241 “[B]etter that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer” is, as Dan Epps puts it,
“perhaps the most revered adage in the criminal law.”242 Owed to the
relative severity of criminal sanctions, criminal adjudication is biased
against false convictions in various ways that, for example, civil
adjudication is not similarly biased against false judgments of liability.
Implicit in this bias, of course, is that the cost of false acquittals is
comparatively low. As scholars going back to Bentham have argued,
however, the cost of false acquittals to crime victims is also significant,

Id. (“Imagine a friend told you that she hoped to meet ‘an actor, director, or producer
involved with the new Star Wars movie.’ You would know immediately that she
wanted to meet an actor from the Star Wars cast—not an actor in, for example, the
latest Zoolander.”).
239 Id. at 970 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (2014)).
240 Id. at 977.
241 A less charitable explanation is that courts fail to take seriously the severity of
criminal sanctions. See Raab, supra note 110, at 188 (highlighting the “infringements
on liberty that have resulted in the discriminatory mass incarceration,
overcriminalization, and overpunishment that characterize the American criminal
justice system today”).
242 Epps, supra note 214, at 1067.
238
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even if not quite as significant as the cost of false convictions to
convicts.243
Taking that seriously, what contemporary courts might be
thinking is that criminal adjudication is similar to decision-making
scenarios in which it is appropriate to act on one’s “best guess” under
conditions of uncertainty. To illustrate, suppose that a bomb is about to
explode, and that a technician can cut one of two wires, red or green.
Cutting the correct wire will diffuse the bomb; cutting the incorrect wire
will cause the bomb to explode. Suppose now that a technician is
moderately confident—say, 65-35—that cutting the red wire will diffuse
the bomb. In that situation, it would, given the stakes, be unreasonable
for the technician to think it “clear” that cutting the red wire will diffuse
the bomb. Be that as it may, she should obviously cut the red wire.
Given the symmetry of the costs of mistake, the rational thing for the
technician to do is to act on her inclination, however modest.
Turning back to criminal adjudication, assume ala Bentham that
the cost of false acquittals is high, but that the cost of false convictions
is slightly higher—as seems entirely plausible in cases involving cocaine
and machineguns or serial sex offenders. On that assumption, how
should a court behave if it is moderately confident—again, 65-35—that
a defendant’s conduct is covered by a criminal statute? As in the bomb
scenario, it would be unreasonable, given the stakes, for the court to say
that it is “clear” that the defendant acted unlawfully. At the same time,
considering the near symmetry of the costs of mistake, it is plausible
that courts should nonetheless enforce the more likely reading of the
statute, acting, in other words, on its “best guess.”244 As bad as wrongful
conviction might be, failing to enforce the criminal law is not to be taken
lightly, in particular when the potential offenses are so serious.
The above story also fits with how courts talk about lenity today.
While the rule of lenity is classically phrased as a rule for “resolv[ing]
ambiguity,” present doctrine is that the “simple existence of some
statutory ambiguity” is not enough to “warrant [the rule’s] application,”
and that instead a court should afford lenity only if it has “no more than
a guess” as to statutory meaning. What this suggests is that, as
presently understood, the rule of lenity does not actually require “clear”
statutory meaning, however much clarity that would require. To the
See id. at 1089-92.
In terms of expected utility, what to do would depend upon how slight the cost
asymmetry turns out to be.
243
244
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contrary, so long as a court has more than a literal “guess” as to what
Congress intended, a court should enforce the reading of the statute it
thinks is most likely correct. That there are other plausible readings is
neither here nor there.245

C. Legislative History
Under current doctrine, courts should consult legislative history
only if the corresponding statutory text is less than “clear.”246 This
doctrine is most naturally and most commonly understood as managing
evidence of statutory meaning.247 For those who do so at all, considering
legislative history helps to “illuminat[e] … what Congress meant,” 248
“shed[ding] light” on the correct reading of the statutory language at
issue.249
Objections to considering legislative history at all are, at this
point, familiar. Justice Scalia and others famously characterized
reliance upon legislative history as effectively permitting members of
Congress (as well as lobbyists and staffers) to circumvent Article I,
§ 7.250 In addition, he worried that attending to legislative history left

The story here is also consistent with continued adherence to the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard of proof in criminal cases. Insofar as it applies to factual,
as opposed to legal, determinations, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard might
serve merely to offset structural advantages at trial enjoyed by the prosecution. Cf.
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1979) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The Bill of
Rights does not envision an adversary proceeding between two equal parties.”).
246 E.g., N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017) (“The text is clear, so we
need not consider this extra-textual evidence.”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory
interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”); Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S.
209, 215 (2005) (“Because the meaning of [the provision’s] text is plain and
unambiguous, we need not accept petitioners’ invitation to consider the legislative
history.”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”).
247 For a contrary view, see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 115-16 (2008) (arguing that resolving statutory
unclarity by appeal to legislative history may appropriate if doing so helps “to
determine which interpretation will maximize expected political satisfaction”).
248 U.S. Dep’t of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982).
249 Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 124 (1985) (“The legislative history of [the statute]
sheds light on its meaning.”).
250 See, e.g., Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176-77 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring
in principal part and concurring in the judgment); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,
245
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judges with nearly unbounded discretion.251 More modestly, Adrian
Vermeule has argued that we have no reason to believe that judges are
any good at evaluating legislative history, which leaves courts without
justification for the tremendous cost that researching legislative history
involves.252
On the other side of this jurisprudential dispute, those who
believe that attending to legislative history is useful occasionally insist
that courts should do so as a matter of course. Justice Stevens, for
example, reasoned that, although “[in] recent years the Court has
suggested that we should only look at legislative history for the purpose
of resolving textual ambiguities,” it would be “wiser to acknowledge that
it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress’
true intent when interpreting its work product.”253
As discussed above, Justice Stevens’s reasoning has initial
plausibility.254 Assuming arguendo that legislative history is probative
of statutory meaning, courts would improve their interpretive accuracy
by considering it in any given case.255 Sometimes, though, interpretive
accuracy isn’t everything. Even if one is more optimistic than Professor
Vermeule concerning courts’ ability to evaluate legislative history, it
seems hard to deny that conducting legislative-history research is, as he
puts it, “costly and time-consuming.”256 As Judge Leventhal cautioned,
“[j]udicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become
… an exercise in “‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’” 257
To protect against that tendency, responsible legislative-history
research requires independent and comprehensive assessment of a
sometimes “massively voluminous” set of materials.258 Even assuming,
then, that judges come out at the end of that process with more accurate
beliefs about statutory meaning, very often cost involved will not be
519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
251 See Scalia, supra note 81, at 35-36.
252 VERMEULE, supra note 64, at 107-15, 192.
253 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004).
254 See supra Part I.A.
255 Assuming, that is, that courts are not unduly biased in favor of legislative history
in comparison with other sources of statutory meaning. Because legislative history is
most often characterized by its critics as a sort of Rorschach test, it is not entirely clear
what being biased in its favor even comes to.
256 VERMEULE, supra note 64, at 193.
257 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (quoting
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)).
258 VERMEULE, supra note 64, at 193
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justified by the resulting accuracy gain. Again, sometimes “cheap and
good enough” really is good enough.
So when (if at all) should courts consider legislative history? The
short answer is: whenever it is worth it. Again, when judging whether
a statutory text is “clear” for purposes of some “clear” text doctrine, a
court is determining whether that text is clear enough for the relevant
purposes.259 For the purpose of managing cost, a court might thus deem
a statutory text “clear” in a relatively unimportant case based upon
moderate epistemic confidence or justification.260 With so little at stake,
why take on the additional burden of wading through a “massively
voluminous” set of materials to improve interpretive accuracy only
somewhat? By contrast, in a more significant case, a court might declare
a text less than “clear” even assuming analogous epistemic justification
or confidence. In that situation, a sufficient amount would be on the line
to justify consulting additional, more expensive sources of statutory
meaning.
Assuming, then, that legislative history is probative of statutory
meaning, the doctrinal status quo seems defensible, at least in relation
to other, cheaper sources of statutory meaning.261 More concerning is
the status quo as it pertains to the relationship between legislative
history and other “clear” text doctrines.262 In United States v. R.L.C.,263
for instance, the question before the Court was how to interpret a statute
limiting juvenile detention to the “maximum term of imprisonment that
would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an
adult.”264 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of committing
an act of juvenile delinquency.265 The district court imposed a sentence
of three-years’ detention, reasoning that three-years’ imprisonment was
the maximum sentence for the analogous offence under the
corresponding statute.266 The Court of Appeals reduced the defendant’s
sentence to 18 months, explaining that 18-months’ imprisonment was
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See Schauer, supra note 98.
261 Indeed, current doctrine seems agnostic as to the probative value of legislative
history insofar as consideration of legislative history is permitted but not required if
statutory text is less than “clear.” See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011).
262 See Gluck, supra note 23, at 2063 (“It remains unanswered whether a policy canon
is still relevant if legislative history alone would clarify statutory language.”).
263 503 U.S. 291 (1992).
264 Id. at 294 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B)).
265 Id. at 295 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 5031).
266 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (imposing a maximum sentence of 3-years’
imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter).
259
260
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the maximum sentence a court could have imposed on a similarly
situated adult after applying the Sentencing Guidelines.267 Writing for
a plurality, Justice Souter started with the statutory text, determining
that the Government’s harsher interpretation was, at best, “one possible
resolution of statutory ambiguity.”268 Justice Souter then went on to
consider the Act’s legislative history, concluding ultimately that the
accompanying Senate Report and “other elements” resolved any
ambiguity in the defendant’s favor.269
Concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas
and Kennedy, insisted that once the Court had concluded that the
statutory text was at most “ambiguous,” that should have been the end
of the case.270 The reason, according to Justice Scalia, was that it was
“not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous
penal statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative
history.”271
The rule of lenity is, again, most plausibly characterized as a rule
of decision—as an empirical matter, there is little reason to think that
members of Congress prefer narrower, as opposed to broader, definitions
of federal crimes, nor is there any indication that federal judges would
be unduly biased in favor of that consideration if it were true.272 Given
that characterization, it is hard to see why there should be any
uncertainty whether courts should consider legislative history within
the lenity framework. What the rule of lenity does, after all, is help
courts “play it safe” in criminal cases under conditions of uncertainty.
But if considering legislative history could help courts become certain of
statutory meaning, why not do so in the course of determining whether
there is a need to “play it safe”?273

R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 295-96; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2A1.4(a)(2) (1991).
268 R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 298.
269 Id. at 303-05.
270 Id. at 307-08.
271 Id. at 307; see also United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 429 (2009) (debating
whether legislative history could be considered to make “clear” a statute before the
rule of lenity would be applied).
272 Again, one can reason similarly about Congress’s “objectified” intent. See supra
note 209 and accompanying text.
273 Alternatively, considering legislative history could make a court uncertain about
statutory meaning, in which case it would have discovered that it has reason to “play
it safe.” Either way, what is relevant is that, by considering legislative history, a court
will have improved its epistemic position, thereby making it assessment concerning
the need to allocate risk better informed.
267
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The inference above is, of course, a general one, applying to rules
of decision across the board.274 Consider, for example, Dellmuth v.
Muth,275 in which the Court held:
Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial
inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment.
If Congress’ intention is
“unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,”
recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary; if
Congress’ intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to
legislative history will be futile, because by definition [the
presumption against abrogation is not overcome].276
The “clear statement” rule concerning state sovereign immunity is
almost certainly about managing uncertainty, as opposed to managing
evidence.277 As the Court explained in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon,278 judicial “reluctance to infer that a State’s immunity from suit
in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the vital
role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.”279
Owed to the “special and specific position in our constitutional system,”
the Court continued, it is thus “incumbent upon the federal courts to be
certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides the
guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment.”280
Taking Atascadero at its word, then, construing a federal statute
as not abrogating state sovereign immunity constitutes “playing it safe”
under conditions of uncertainty for the reason that unsettling the “usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government”
is a really big deal.281 Whatever one thinks of that assessment, it is,
again, hard to see why courts ought not to consider legislative history
when determining whether Congress has spoken with “unmistakabl[e]
Again, courts do consider legislative history within the Chevron framework. See
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
275 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
276 Id. at 230 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
277 See Eskridge, supra note 28, at 613 (characterizing the application of pro-federalism
canons by courts as “activist”). The same is likely true of, for example, the other profederalism canons. Seem e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991)
(recognizing a “clear” statement rule concerning federal regulation of fundamental
aspects of state sovereignty); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947)
(recognizing a presumption against federal preemption of state law).
278 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
279 Id. at 242.
280 Id. at 243.
281 Id. at 242-43.
274
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cl[arity].” Even conceding that statutory text is the “best evidence” of
what Congress intends,282 it is, by no means, the only evidence. And
what that means is that, at least in some cases, turning from statutory
text to legislative history will eliminate (or create) doubt—again,
assuming that considering legislative history is helpful in general.

D. Chevron/Skidmore
Chevron holds that a reviewing court should enforce an agency’s
reading of a statute that the agency administers so long as the agency’s
reading is not “clear[ly]” inconsistent with the statutory text.283 As the
Court in that case explained, resolving statutory unclarity very often
amounts to a “policy choice[],” and within our constitutional system, the
“‘responsibilit[y]’” for such choices resides with “‘the political
branches.’”284 In view of that explanation, Chevron is understood most
naturally as a rule of decision. An agency’s views within the Chevron
framework are, as discussed above, not treated as evidence of statutory
meaning.285 To the contrary, a reviewing court defers to an agency only
if statutory meaning has run out, or, at the very least, is uncertain.
Resolving statutory unclarity is, consistent with this story,
characterized as “fill[ing]” a “gap” in the law left by Congress.286 The
absence of identifiable law is what makes it appropriate to defer to a
more technically competent and more politically accountable agency.287
In terms of uncertainty management, the thought here seems to
be that, at a certain point, ‘interpreting’ an unclear statute amounts to
policymaking insofar as the content of the law is underdetermined or,
alternatively, unknowable.288 Reversing an agency action in such
West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (“The best
evidence of [Congress’] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of
Congress and submitted to the President”); but see Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11,
at 562 (observing that the relative probative value of textual and non-textual evidence
is “difficult to assess on a categorical basis”)
283 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
284 Id. at 866 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
285 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
286 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
287 Id. at 865-66.
288 In the latter situation, even though there is law that settles the dispute in question,
courts lack epistemic access to it and so must decide the case on non-legal grounds.
See Hrafn Asgeirsson, Can Legal Practice Adjudicate between Theories of Vagueness?,
in VAGUENESS AND THE LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 95 (Geert Keil
282
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circumstances would thus amount to “substitut[ing]” a court’s policy
choice for those of an agency—an agency tasked with making those sorts
of choices.289 On that story, courts thereby “play it safe” by reversing an
agency action only if they know there is law that precludes it. “[E]ven if
the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best
statutory interpretation,” the reasoning goes, best not to risk
encroaching upon that agency’s assigned policymaking authority.290
Whether that reasoning makes sense may turn upon the correct
understanding of the role of the judiciary. “It is,” as we are reminded so
often, “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”291 And, as Justice Thomas observes, “[t]hose who
ratified the Constitution knew that legal texts would often contain
ambiguities,” which is why “[t]he judicial power was understood to
include the power to resolve these ambiguities over time.”292 Heard one
way, Justice Thomas’s observation suggests that courts needn’t be so
hesitant to fill statutory “gaps”—sometimes the law is unsettled, and it
is the job of courts, and not agencies, to settle it. Heard another way, of
course, all that Justice Thomas’s observation entails is that courts
should try to identify and declare statutory meaning, even if doing so is
hard. Legal texts are, uncontroversially, not always easy to make sense
of. Sometimes, though, courts can attend carefully to an “ambiguous”
statute and figure out what it means.293 In those situations, ambiguity
is indeed “resolved,” but resolved through discovery, as opposed to
stipulation—that is, as opposed to policymaking. If, then, the judicial
power includes merely the “power” to say what the law is even if the law
is hard to discern, that says very little about what courts should do if
the law cannot be discerned, or at least not discerned with adequate
confidence.294

& Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (discussing epistemic and non-epistemic theories of legal
indeterminacy).
289 Id. at 843-44, 865-66.
290 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005).
291 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
292 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015).
293 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
294 Insofar as the role of the judiciary is to “say what the law is,” perhaps worth
mentioning is that, on the standard account of assertion, it is appropriate to say that
p (e.g., “The law is precludes the agency’s action.”) only if one knows that p (e.g., only
if one knows that the law precludes the agency’s action). See TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON,
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 243 (2000).
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Rather than adjudicate that familiar dispute,295 though, it is
maybe more interesting to consider Chevron’s doctrinal complement,
Skidmore.296 Like Chevron, Skidmore puts a thumb on the scale in favor
of agency readings. Unlike Chevron, however, Skidmore appears to
treat an agency’s views as evidence of statutory meaning. To elaborate,
Skidmore holds that an agency’s reading of some statute that agency
handles is entitled to “respect proportional to its ‘power to persuade.’”297
The opinion articulates numerous factors that help to determine the
amount of “respect” a particular reading is owed, including “the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,”
and, of special interest here, “its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements.”298 Most tellingly, Skidmore instructs courts to assign
(potentially “considerable”) “weight” to an agency’s reading, weighing it
along with other evidence of statutory meaning in an effort to determine
the statute’s “better”299 or “correct”300 interpretation.301

For recent, helpful treatments of these and other objections to Chevron, see
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV.
937 (2018) (considering both constitutional objections); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as
Law (manuscript) (considering both constitutional and statutory objections, defending
Chevron on stare decisis grounds).
296 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136 (1944).
The account of the
Chevron/Skidmore relationship in this section is broadly consistent with the one
articulated by Peter Strauss. See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s
Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 116465 (2012) (arguing that “Skidmore weight” should be conceived as one of the
“traditional tools of statutory construction” applied by courts at Chevron Step One).
The main purpose of this section is, thus, to situate that account within a broader
analytical framework.
297 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S.
at 140)).
298 Here Skidmore contrasts importantly with Chevron.
See Nat’l Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)
(holding that “agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s
interpretation under the Chevron framework”); Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (“[C]hange is not invalidating, since the whole point of
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the
implementing agency.”).
299 Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA., 292 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reasoning that
if Chevron is inapplicable, then the “better” interpretation prevails).
300 Campesinos Unidos, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 803 F.2d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“Although not binding on this court, the Secretary’s interpretation of his own
regulation is entitled to some deference, and here we believe that interpretation to be
correct.” (emphasis added)).
301 See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1256 (2007) (acknowledging that “most of the
Court’s post-Mead applications of Skidmore review reflect the independent judgment
model”); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of
295
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It makes sense that agencies might have insight into what a
statute means. Statutes often deal with technical subject matter, and
technical expertise can be an important interpretive resource when
making sense of technical statutes.302 Agencies are also sometimes
involved with the drafting of statutes, providing intimate knowledge of
how those statutes were understood at the time of enactment.303 Last
and most obvious, agencies deal with statutes on a day-to-day basis in
all sorts of settings, providing awareness of both statutory details and
overall structure.304
In terms of structure, Skidmore is, importantly, not a “clear” text
doctrine. Instead of telling courts to consider an agency’s views only if
other sources leave statutory meaning uncertain, courts attend to such
views in the course of the general interpretive inquiry. That seems
sensible insofar as it is hard to see what special consideration(s) would
call for lexical ordering in this instance. Taking account of an agency’s
views is hardly cost-prohibitive. Nor does it seem that courts would be
unduly biased in an agency’s favor, at least controlling for partisan
leanings.
More difficult to understand is why courts treat Skidmore and
Chevron as alternatives. Generally speaking, courts reason that
Skidmore “respect” is owed in cases that fall outside of Chevron’s
“domain.”305 That seems odd insofar as Skidmore and Chevron appear
Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1015 (2005) (“[Mead] basically instructs courts to exercise
independent judgment regarding statutory meaning subject to the weak requirement
that they carefully consider agency views for persuasiveness [if Chevron does not
apply].”).
302 Hickman & Krueger, supra note 300, at 1249 (“[A]s the Skidmore Court
acknowledged, courts often lack the resources and expertise to understand and
evaluate fully the consequences of complex statutory schemes.”).
303 See Jarrod Shobe, Agencies As Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of
Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 455 (2017) (describing
“various ways … agencies are involved in legislative drafting”); see also Norwegian
Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (explaining that an
agency interpretation adopted contemporaneously with the statute’s passage has
“peculiar weight”).
304 Such awareness could serve as a helpful check against what Victoria Nourse terms
“isolationist” interpretation. See Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text: Lessons
for Statutory Interpretation from the Philosophy of Language, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1409
(2017)) (identifying and criticizing the practice “pull[ing] a term out of a statute and
isolat[ing] it from the rest of the text”).
305 See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1441 (2017) (characterizing Mead as having “limited the scope of
Chevron’s applicability to agency actions carrying the force of law and reinstated the
multifactor Skidmore standard as an alternative for those that do not”).

59

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326550

logically unrelated. Again, under Skidmore, an agency’s views are
evidence of statutory meaning. Under Chevron, by contrast, those views
constitute a legal basis for deciding a case if statutory meaning is
unknown. Assuming those two characterizations are correct, it seems
unmotivated to consider an agency’s views as evidence of statutory
meaning only in those situations in which an agency lacks the authority
to make binding policy choices.306 To the contrary, insofar as the
question for cases within Chevron’s domain is whether Congress has
spoken “clearly,” it seems that, in the course of that inquiry, courts
should afford an agency interpretation the “respect” such
interpretations are owed.
Notice further that, insofar as courts were to afford Skidmore
“respect” when determining whether a statutory text is “clear” for
purposes of Chevron, the dispute between Justice Gorsuch and Justice
Alito concerning how clear a text has to be to count as “clear” under
Chevron would become less consequential. Even if, after all, courts were
to gravitate towards Justice Gorsuch’s position, treating 55-45 as the
threshold for “clear,” insofar as courts were simultaneously to start
treating the agency’s interpretation as evidence of statutory meaning,
the overall framework would remain substantially deferential.307
To be sure, courts might also decide that affording “respect” to
informal agency interpretations is better justified by appeal to
pragmatic considerations like technical expertise and democratic
accountability—that is, courts might reconceive Skidmore as a rule of
decision.308 In that event, courts would presumably do best to reject
consistency as an indicator of respectworthiness, just as they have with
Chevron.309 More still, courts would need to transform Skidmore into a
“clear” text doctrine, the reason being that, as with Chevron, an agency’s
views would no longer be regarded as relevant to the question of

See Mead, 533 U.S. at 219 (explaining that a “very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment is express congressional authorizations to engage in the
rulemaking or adjudication process”).
307 Of course, if courts were to begin affording Skidmore “respect” when determining
“clarity while also adhering to a relatively demanding clarity threshold, the overall
framework would be even more favorable to agencies than it currently is.
308 Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (2011) (observing an analogous “transformation” in the
rationale for deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations).
309 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
306
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statutory meaning.310 In other words, reconceived as a rule of decision,
an agency’s informal views would only come in under Skidmore once
statutory meaning had run out.

CONCLUSION
Doctrines like Chevron or the plain meaning rule can be
frustrating. Sometimes courts declare statutory text “clear” (or not), and
it seems grounded in little more than partisanship. In such moments,
it is tempting to say that “clarity” standards are the problem—too easily
manipulated by willful or motivated judges. The question, though, is,
what is the alternative? Why think that other standards would be any
less easy to manipulate? And assuming we adopted “clear” text
doctrines for a reason, what would we be giving up by abandoning them?
“clear” text doctrines do require additional, more systematic
scrutiny. As this Article argues, though, such doctrines need to be
scrutinized individually, not all in one go. Chevron and the plain
meaning rule do very different things and serve very different purposes.
At the end of the day, it may be that courts do best to abandon one or
both of those doctrines. But if that’s true, it is for reasons having to do
with those specific doctrines, and not with the abstract idea of “clear”
text. More still, those individual doctrines can be assessed in a perfectly
rational and organized fashion. As this Article shows, once one
understands what different “clear” text doctrines do, it becomes much
more straightforward to assess whether they do it well.

On this approach, the degree of clarity required would, presumably, be inversely
proportional to the degree of “respect” qua policy determination the agency’s informal
views were owed.
310
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